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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  BACKGROUND 
The near simultaneous attacks of September 11, 2001 on the Pentagon and World 
Trade Center were traumatic events for the nation and its leadership.  Although the scope 
of these incidents was unprecedented in magnitude and psychological impact, they should 
not have come as a surprise.  There was a widely recognized trend in terrorism of 
increasing lethality through the 1990s.  In fact, attacks of this nature were not new.  In 
1993 terrorists attempted to topple the World Trade Center with a truck bomb.  Also, in 
1994 Algerian terrorists attempted to fly an aircraft laden with fuel into the Eiffel 
Tower.1  In addition to the lethality trend, the attacks of September 11 were part of a 
series of strikes against US targets.  In 1998 Al-Qaeda struck US embassies in Africa and 
two years later nearly sunk the USS Cole in Yemen.  Irregardless, the events of 
September 11 marked a turning point in US efforts against terrorism.  Before 9-11 
terrorism was just one of many threats confronting the US.  On September 12 terrorism 
and its supporters became the primary threat to US security in the eyes of the 
administration and much of the nation. 
This thesis examines US counterterrorism strategy before and after 9-11 with a 
focus on the role of the military.  Chapter I describes the organization of the thesis.  It 
also includes a brief review of the perceived threat posed by terrorism during the years 
prior to 9-11 and perceptions of the threat following the attacks.  Chapter II discusses the 
evolution of US counterterrorism strategy during the Clinton Administration.  Although 
the Clinton administration did not have a named counterterrorism strategy, this chapter 
tries to determine whether collectively the Clinton policies made up a coherent strategy. 
The chapter then looks at US unclassified counterterrorism operations during the 1990s 
and evaluates the role of the military in the fight against terrorism.  This analysis is 
limited by the reliance on unclassified information and the ambiguity in descriptions of 
operations.   
                                                 
1 Michael A. Vatis, Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing Our Nation in Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (Dartmouth: 8 April 2003) <http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ISTS/ists_docs/testimony_lib.htm> 
(12/5/2003). 
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Chapter III analyzes the current US strategy for combating terrorism and its 
relation to the US National Security Strategy.  Policy is evaluated in several areas 
including changes following 9-11, the role of the military, and implementation versus 
rhetoric.  The chapter also evaluates the current strategy against generally accepted 
theories on combating terrorism.  To be successful, US strategy must be based on sound 
theory and address the real, not perceived threat.  One question is whether US strategy 
has changed or if differences in US actions are simply due to more aggressive 
implementation of pre-existing strategies.  The role of the military in domestic and 
international counterterrorism operations is investigated.  The focus of this analysis is to 
determine the extent of the role of the military in the fight against terrorists.  The premise 
is that new roles may lead to degradation of the military and friction between the military, 
society and civilian leaders. 
Chapter IV evaluates the implications of the war on terrorism for the military and 
its relationship with the civilian leadership and society.  The focus of this chapter is on 
US actions taken to date and their potential impact on the military.  Chapter V reviews 
the findings of the earlier chapters and discusses prospects for US success in the war on 
terror.  The prospects for success are based on the alignment of US strategy with current 
theory.  Success is also a function of implementation.  Strategy must be based on theory 
and actions must be based on the declared strategy or sound theory.  A perfect strategy 
executed poorly will still result in failure. 
    
B.  PURPOSE 
The central question or thesis concerns the impact of current counterterrorism 
strategy and its execution on the military and society.  In the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, US counterterrorism strategy underwent major changes.  
The administration’s expectation is that these changes will make US efforts to fight 
terrorism more effective.  Although the administration takes the long view, it publicly 
claims that the fight against terrorism can be won.  The current US counterterrorism 
strategy takes a systems view in order to apply all means of US power to the fight.  This 
has resulted in a greatly expanded role for the military.  This expanded military role 
involves political and social costs for the military.  Some of these costs are known or at 
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least generally agreed on, while others are currently unknown.  In order to properly 
evaluate US counterterrorism strategy, the known and expected costs need to be weighed 
against the prospects for success.   
US counterterrorism actions changed following the events of 9-11.  One question 
concerns how much US strategy has changed.  Another question involves how 
counterterrorism operations have changed since 9-11.  Strategy and doctrine do not 
necessarily have to change for operations to change significantly.  A change in leadership 
can result in identical doctrine being applied differently.  Doctrine and strategy provide a 
framework for operations.  Leadership and personality drive the execution of operations.  
The changing role of the US military in counterterrorism operations needs to be 
examined in the context of changes in both strategy and operations.  Changes in the role 
of the military impact both the military and the society it serves. 
The change in strategy since 9-11 does not appear to be as significant as the 
change in operations and execution of the strategy.  US counterterrorism strategy has 
evolved throughout the 90s.  The perceived terrorist threat has been evolving and 
growing in the eyes of politicians.  The events of 9-11 provided a trigger for a new scale 
of application of US counterterrorism strategy.  This aggressive execution of 
counterterrorism operations appears to be as much administration/personality based as it 
is strategy based.  The Clinton administration applied military forces against terrorists but 
without the current level of commitment or aggression.  The application of US strategy 
has led to an expanded role for the military both domestically and abroad.   
Changes in US counterterrorism strategy and operations have lead to a 
significantly expanded role for the military.  New roles and missions will have a 
significant impact on the military.  The key issue when evaluating the impact of an 
expanded role on the military is the impact on its ability to accomplish its primary 
mission as determined by the civilian government.  In the end the military is a tool and at 
times, will need to suffer hard use that damages it.  A key question is whether the current 
strategy and expanded role improves the nation’s prospects for success.  Terrorism is a 
complicated issue that has evaded simple solutions in the past.  The military is a 
relatively blunt instrument while the elimination of terrorists requires precision.  
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Furthermore the elimination of terrorism requires more than a military solution.  Use of 
the military may be necessary but it is only part of the solution.  
Generally expansion of the military role in domestic counterterrorism will have 
negative implications for the military and its relations with the society it serves.  The 
expanded role of the military abroad will have a positive impact on its relation with 
society but may have negative implications for the military, and international relations.  
In the fight against terrorism, the US has fought two wars and deployed hundreds of 
thousands of troops around the world.  The US policy of preemption has strained 
relations with the international community and strained the capabilities of the military.  
The costs of these actions have been high but the benefits are difficult to measure.  
Opinion polls are not an adequate measure of success for our counterterrorism strategy.  
Given the known costs of the strategy, the benefits must be significant and quantifiable. 
 
C.  THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
To conduct a fair assessment of US counterterrorism policies and strategies it is 
necessary to understand the perceived threats that inspired them.  Threat perceptions are 
different from threat assessments and may have little to do with reality.  Despite potential 
disconnects between perception and reality, it is perceptions that influence decisions.  In 
the case of the United States the terrorist threat has traditionally been viewed in terms of 
domestic versus international groups.  This is both a logical division and a bureaucratic 
one.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead federal agency (LFA) for 
domestic terrorism while the State Department is the LFA for overseas terrorist acts and 
international terrorist groups.  For the purpose of this paper I will review the nature of the 
threat as defined by the FBI, and threat perceptions before the attacks of 9-11, primarily 
those of the Clinton administration, and perceptions after 9-11. 
There is no single definition of terrorism used by the federal government.  There 
is one definition in the code of federal regulations, and at least two others in use by the 
FBI and State Department.  Despite minor differences most use a definition provided by 
RAND as a starting point.  “Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to 
create an atmosphere of fear and alarm, through acts designed to coerce others into 
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actions they otherwise would not undertake or into refraining from actions that they 
desired to take.  All terrorist acts are crimes.”2  Some definitions specify attacks against 
non-combatants but do not make it clear whether soldiers in peacetime are non-
combatants.  This could remove a number of major attacks against US forces from the 
tally of terrorist attacks.  These include: the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, 
the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, and the attack on the USS Cole in 
Yemen.   
The FBI divides terrorist organizations into domestic and international groups.  
The division is based on the origin of the organization, its base of operations, and its 
objectives.  Domestic terrorist groups receive no foreign direction and operate entirely 
within the US or its territories.  Domestic terrorist groups are further subdivided into 
right-wing, left-wing, and special interest groups.  International terrorists are categorized 
as state sponsors, formal organizations, or loosely affiliated extremists.3  In its 1999 
report the FBI cited increasing threats overseas, growing interest in WMD, and a trend 
toward decentralization. 
The Clinton administration viewed terrorism as a potential threat to national 
security and a criminal act.4  The administration did not consider terrorists the primary 
threat to the nation.  Terrorism was considered one of many transnational threats facing 
the United States.  The proliferation of WMD was seen as the greatest potential threat to 
global stability and security.5  This perception was apparent in the actions taken and 
policies pushed forward by the executive.  Clinton’s policies focused on preventing or 
slowing the spread of WMD and improving the security of critical infrastructure.  Efforts 
were also made to improve consequence management capabilities.  Ironically it was a 
                                                 
2Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Gilmore Commission), I. Assessing the Threat: First Annual Report to The President and The 
Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 15, 1999)  <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/index.html> 
(July 2003), iii. This panel is referred to as the Gilmore Commission after its chairman, James S. Gilmore, 
III) 
3 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1999 
(Washington D.C.), iii, 17, 23. 
4 U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, PDD-39 ” 
(Washington D.C.: June 21, 1995), <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm> (10/22/2003). 
5 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington D.C.: December 
1999). 
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failed chemical attack by Aum Shinrikyo that focused attention on the threat posed by 
CBRN weapons and proliferation.  The attack on the Tokyo subway used sarin and killed 
12.6  The sarin was manufactured by the cult and the incident represents a case study of 
the difficulties in staging an effective chemical or biological attack.  
The fight against terrorism was left primarily to law enforcement.  This primacy 
of law enforcement was in keeping with the view of terrorism as a crime and as one of 
many threats of criminal origin to US security.  The primacy of law enforcement also 
made sense when seen in the light of FBI assessments.  Despite the attention paid to Al-
Qaeda and other foreign organizations, domestic groups have conducted the majority of 
terrorist attacks in the US over the last 30 years.7  However there was one contradiction 
between threat assessment and actions taken.  After citing the primary role of domestic 
terrorist groups and growing terrorist interest in WMD, the FBI failed to produce a 
written assessment of the threat posed by domestic groups and chemical/biological 
weapons.8  Despite the new emphasis on infrastructure protection, the FBI didn’t focus 
on the most likely source of attack.   
The Clinton team emphasized the criminal nature of terrorism and favored a law 
enforcement approach.  This was true for both domestic and international terrorism.  
They focused tightly on the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its supporters.  The 
administration imposed sanctions on the Taliban in an effort to force the turnover of Bin 
Laden.  Following attacks on US embassies in Africa, Clinton took military action 
against Al-Qaeda but not against its Taliban hosts.  He took a broader view of the threat 
posed by weapons of mass destruction, (WMD) or the more descriptive term, chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.  The administration considered 
this a major threat and devoted significant efforts to preventing proliferation and 
improving US capabilities to respond to an attack.  Oddly, they appeared to consider the 
threat of terrorism and WMD separately.  The scope of the WMD threat was considered 
significant and played a major role in policy development.  The scope of the terrorist 
                                                 
6 The attack killed 12 and injured up to 5,000.  Gilmore, I. Assessing the Threat, 46-51. 
7 FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1999, 16. 
8 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism, Need for Comprehensive Threat Assessments of 
Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO-99-163 (Washington D.C.: September 1999), 17. 
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threat was seen as growing but was looked at as one of many problems.  Even following 
the election of George Bush in 2000, the role of law enforcement was still central to the 
fight against terrorism.   
The trauma of 9-11 completely changed the perceived threat posed by terrorism 
and the priority assigned it by the government.  Where previously it had been treated as 
one of many challenges to US security, overnight it became the preeminent threat facing 
the US. On September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed the nation and declared the 
US a nation at war with terror.9  The threat had not changed overnight but the perception 
of the threat changed drastically. 
In reality, the nature of the threat remained relatively constant.  However, the 
perceived scope and immediacy of the threat changed.  WMD retained a central position 
but were now tied directly to the terrorist threat.  In the National Security Strategy, the 
crossroads of technology and radicalism is identified as the gravest danger facing the 
nation.  This connection and a need for revenge drove the US to take a more offensive 
posture and expand the role of the military.  The National Security Strategy released in 
2002 cites military power at the top of the list of tools for fighting terrorism.10  The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security states that terrorism directly threatens the 
foundations of the nation and that the government has no more important mission than 
defending the homeland against terrorists.  This strategy also plays up the availability and 
threat posed by chemical and biological weapons.11  
                                                 
9 U.S. President, speech, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People” 
(Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html> (11/29/2003). 
10 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: September 
2002), i-ii. 
11 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: July 
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II. COMBATING TERRORISM: STRATEGY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO 9-11 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national 
counterterrorism strategy.  This does not mean that previous administrations ignored the 
threat.  It simply means that based on their assessments, defense against terrorist attacks 
was not a national priority.  Terrorism was considered a lower level threat that could be 
addressed through policy directives and normal law enforcement practices.  The 
traumatic events of 9-11 radically altered the national perception of the terrorist threat 
and the governments’ attitude towards the threat.  As evident in the National Security 
Strategy of 2002, the threat of terrorism and the potential consequences of successful 
terrorist attacks have taken center stage in government planning.  However, this change 
in emphasis does not necessarily mean a change in strategy.  This chapter will examine 
US policies for combating terrorism prior to 9-11.  It will try to determine whether the 
policies, put forth in a variety of documents, formed the equivalent of a national strategy 
when looked at in sum.  The chapter will also look at the implementation of this strategy 
or collection of policies.  However, given the number of government agencies and 
departments involved in the fight against terrorism, the chapter will focus on the roles, 
missions, and use of the military to combat terrorism and defend the homeland. 
The impact of September 11th on the American people and especially the 
government is obvious from a review of the last National Security Strategy (December 
1999) of the Clinton administration and the first National Security Strategy (September 
2002) of the Bush administration.  Clinton’s final strategy acknowledges the threat of 
terrorism but it is still optimistic and forward looking with a focus on engagement.  Even 
its title is upbeat, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century.”  It identifies the 
United States’ central challenge as one of  “ seizing the opportunities of this new global 
era…”12  The strategy addresses three core objectives: to enhance America’s security, to 
bolster America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy and human rights 
                                                 
12 The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: December 
1999), iii. 
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abroad. None of these core national security objectives focused directly on the threat 
posed by terrorism.  All three were founded on the premise of the positive effects of 
global engagement. 
The strategy for enhancing US security consisted of three components: shaping 
the international security environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for 
an uncertain future.13  Of these three components, responding to threats and crises, 
addresses the terrorist threat most directly.  Even so, it discusses terrorism as one of 
several transnational threats facing the US.  In its discussion of terrorism the strategy 
notes past efforts against and states the determination of the US to “apprehend and bring 
to justice those who terrorize American citizens.”  The strategy emphasizes law 
enforcement and diplomatic tools but does reserve the right of the US to strike terrorist 
bases and sponsors.  It cites the cruise missile attacks in Afghanistan and Sudan in 
response to the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.  It goes on to 
state that “The strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat 
of further terrorist attacks…”14 
While it cites the imminent threat of new attacks, the cruise missile strikes were 
really a response to the embassy bombings in the tradition of the Reagan ordered 
bombing of Muammar Qadafi in Libya.  In both cases the strikes served two purposes.  
They demonstrated that attacks against the US would not go unpunished, and they 
attempted to deter future attacks.  There was no evidence that chemical weapons from the 
Sudan were going to be used against American targets and the attacks in Afghanistan 
were not targeted or timed precisely enough to kill Usama Bin Laden or prevent further 
attacks by destroying the Al-Qaeda leadership.  The strikes were a tit-for-tat response to 
the terrorist attacks and an attempt to send a message that the US could not be attacked 
with impunity. 
The overall tone and message of the Clinton National Security Strategy is one of 
optimism and international cooperation.  Most problems can be solved through the 
international system and force is an option of last resort.  Terrorism is not a major focus 
                                                 
13 Ibid. , 5. 
14 Ibid. , 14-15. 
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of the strategy.  When terrorism is addressed the focus is on responding to attacks and the 
apprehension of terrorists.  The emphasis is on deterrence, diplomacy, and justice rather 
than the use of force for preemption and revenge.  While this strategy does not ignore 
terrorism, it is not preoccupied with it.  The strategy envisions a world of opportunities 
where the spread of prosperity and democracy through US engagement will make the 
world a safer place for everyone. 
   
B. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND POLICIES 
US counterterrorism policy was first formalized in 1986, when the Reagan 
administration issued National Security Decision Directive 207 (NSDD 207).  This 
directive focused on terrorist incidents overseas but addressed the need for interagency 
cooperation at home and abroad.  It tasked a National Security Council (NSC) 
interagency working group with coordinating the national response to terrorist incidents.  
It reaffirmed the State Department as the lead federal agency (LFA) for policy, programs, 
and responses to international terrorism and designated the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) as LFA for domestic terrorism.15  This was the extent of US 
counterterrorism policy for the next 10 years.  Terrorism was seen as something that 
sometimes touched US citizens but generally happened far away.  This perception and 
public complacency meant that terrorism remained low on the government agenda.  
Priorities seemed to change in 1995, when President Clinton issued Presidential Decision 
Directive 39 (PDD 39) shortly after the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City.  
This section will look at the policies that formed the foundation of US counterterrorism 
efforts during the Clinton administration.  It will then assess whether these foundation 
policies combined with other laws and directives formed the equivalent of a national 
counterterrorism strategy. 
   
1. Foundation of a National Strategy  
PDD 39 outlined the new US policy on counterterrorism.  This document formed 
the foundation of counterterrorism strategy and programs prior to the terrorist attacks of 
                                                 
15 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement 
National Policy, GAO/NSIAD-97-254 (Washington D.C.: September 1997), 17. 
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September 11.  US counterterrorism policy, as stated in PDD 39, was to deter, defeat, and 
respond to all terrorist attacks against US citizens, territory, or facilities no matter where 
they occurred.  The policy described terrorism as a criminal act and a potential threat to 
national security.  In discussing the response to terrorism, the focus was on the 
criminality of the terrorist act and a law enforcement response.  In outlining appropriate 
means, the policy referred to apprehension and prosecution.  The policy described four 
steps to be taken to ensure the US was prepared to combat terrorism at home and abroad. 
These steps consisted of: reducing vulnerability, deterring terrorism, responding 
to terrorism, and developing the capability to detect, prevent, and manage the 
consequences of attacks employing WMD.  Reduction of vulnerability lacks focus and is 
expensive but straightforward.  Deterrence is supposed to be accomplished through the 
energetic pursuit of terrorists and their sponsors, and by convincing the world that 
terrorism will not change US policies.  The capability to respond to terrorist acts 
decisively supports deterrence.  Finally the policy places top priority on preventing 
terrorists from obtaining WMD capabilities.16   
Although this policy forms a foundation, it is not a strategy.  It opens the 
discussion on terrorism but it does very little in the way of establishing priorities or 
assigning responsibilities.  It states that the threat posed by proliferation and use of WMD 
is a top priority but this is the last item discussed.  Normally the most important issue is 
discussed up front.  The only specific responsibilities assigned are the requirement for the 
Attorney General to make recommendations on infrastructure vulnerability, and for the 
FBI and State Department to develop emergency support teams. (EST) 
No other specific priorities or responsibilities are assigned.  In fact, there are 
several things that this policy fails to address.  The most important shortcoming is the 
failure to assign specific taskings with timelines and due dates.  This one failing relegates 
the document to a statement of good intentions.  Another key failing is the neglect of 
threat assessments in favor of vulnerability assessments.  Vulnerability analysis is easier 
but is open-ended and is not very helpful in targeting resources.  The policy also fails to 
                                                 
16 U.S. President, Presidential Decision Directive, “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, PDD-39 ” 
(Washington D.C.: June 21, 1995), <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm> (10/22/2003), reduction of 
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outline a structure for coordination and leadership of the fight against terrorism.  The 
responsibility for direction continued to lie with the National Security Council (NSC) but 
this body is over-stretched and lacks accountability.  In the end the policy really just 
directed government the agencies concerned to keep doing what they were doing, only 
more if it related to terrorism.17 
PDD 62 and 63, both issued in 1998 were intended to expand on PDD 39 and 
further clarify government policy for fighting terrorism.  PDD 62 established the National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.  The 
coordinator works within the NSC and reports to the President through the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs.  The coordinator is responsible for preparing 
an annual report on security preparedness.18  PDD 63 calls for a national effort to protect 
the nation’s infrastructure.  This was the first directive to specify any concrete steps and 
assign deadlines.  The directive established the National Infrastructure Protection Center 
(NIPC) within the FBI.  The center was chartered to provide warning and information, 
and to respond to attacks on the nation’s infrastructure.  In addition, all government 
agencies and departments were required to develop critical infrastructure protection plans 
within 180 days. 
The goal of the policy was to develop some capability to protect critical 
infrastructure by 2000 and a full protective capability within five years of the issue of the 
policy.  The policy was based on close coordination and collaboration between the 
government and private sectors.  The stated intent was to eliminate any significant 
vulnerability.19   
Both PDD-62 and 63 focus on infrastructure vulnerability to terrorist attacks.  
They also focus primarily on the threat posed by terrorists using WMD or computer 
                                                 
17 This thesis uses the unclassified version of PDD 39.  Significant portions of the document were 
blacked out.  Sanitized portions that may have changed this analysis include: responding to terrorism and 
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capabilities and lead federal agencies were also removed. 
18The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, Combating Terrorism: Presidential 
Decision Directive 62 (Annapolis, May 22, 1998), <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62:htm> 
(10/22/2003). 
19 White Paper: The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (Washington, D.C.: Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, May 1998) 
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attacks.  Essentially, the policies provide guidance for defending against terrorists, not 
fighting them.  Given this focus on defense there are still flaws in the policies. 
First, the coordinator is not a cabinet-level position.  It has no bureaucratic 
powerbase and no budget of its own.  Second, while the coordinator can provide advice 
on budgets to departments and agencies, the position has no budget authority.  PDD-63 
establishes the requirement to develop infrastructure protection plans but provides no 
money to implement the plans.  Without direction and funding these plans will end up as 
additional unfounded projects.  The final, most critical flaw is the continued focus on 
vulnerability.  This focus, which began with PDD-39, ignores the difference between 
probable threats and potential but highly unlikely threats.  While the number of potential 
threats is limitless, the number of significant and likely threats is relatively limited and 
much more manageable. 
Threat assessments allow you to target and prioritize your resources.  Resources 
should be focused on realistic, credible, and likely threats.  A vulnerability assessment 
results in a never ending “to do list.”  In a free society like America, you are essentially 
vulnerable everywhere.  This is especially true when looking at the economy and 
infrastructure.  It is possible, for a price, to protect major government and private 
facilities.  It is impossible to protect all major power, water, natural gas, and oil lines.  It 
is also impossible to protect the economy and its infrastructure.  This is because the 
foundation of the economy is public confidence and this confidence is not based on the 
protection of key infrastructure.  Two recent events prove this: the attacks of 9-11, and 
the Washington D.C. area sniper attacks. 
The attacks on 9-11 damaged the Pentagon and destroyed the World Trade Center 
along with several nearby buildings.  Although the attacks also damaged the New York 
City communications infrastructure and disrupted the New York based financial markets 
they had not targeted this infrastructure.  The attacks targeted American symbols and the 
confidence they inspired.  The attack on American confidence was extremely successful.  
Air traffic in the US was 60 percent below normal for the last week of September 2001 
15 
and was still 10 percent below normal in June 2002.20  The attacks are estimated to have 
cost the US economy $191 billion and pushed several airlines to the brink of 
bankruptcy.21 
The D.C. sniper attacks were not conducted by political or ideological terrorists.  
Despite their lack of a higher goal, the snipers still managed to paralyze the capital 
district, captivate the nation’s attention, and further erode public confidence.  It is not 
difficult to imagine the impact of a widespread sniping campaign conducted with the 
specific goal of spreading fear and destroying American confidence. 
A vulnerability assessment that is not based on a valid threat assessment is a 
wasted effort.  Worse, it can lead to the squandering of valuable resources in efforts to 
eliminate vulnerabilities where there is no credible threat.  A stand-alone vulnerability 
analysis quickly leads to a “sky is falling” syndrome.  A given target is assessed to be 
potentially vulnerable and the potential consequences are catastrophic so huge efforts are 
exerted to reduce the target’s vulnerability.  The problem is this diverts resources from 
targets facing credible threats.  During the 90s the US government started programs to 
reduce the vulnerability of infrastructure but these efforts did nothing to prevent the 
attacks of 9-11 or the D.C. sniper attacks.  The FAA and ATF expanded their canine 
explosives detection programs.  Customs increased searches of passengers, baggage, and 
cargo leaving the US.  Finally, the ATF was directed to reduce traffic in illegal 
firearms.22  On 9-11, the terrorists boarded domestic flights and used the planes 
themselves as bombs, while the D.C. snipers were able to obtain their weapons illegally.  
PDDs-39, 62, and 63 represent the foundation of a national counterterrorism 
strategy but they are policy documents, not a strategy.  The question remains, was a real 
national strategy built on this foundation prior to 9-11.  A quick review of government 
                                                 
20 Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the September 12 Era (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2003), 153, 488.  For month by month numbers see the Air Transport Association website. 
<http://www.air-transport.org/public/news> (12/7/2003). 
21 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Impact of Terrorist Attacks on the World Trade 
Center, GAO-02-700R (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2002), p. 26, Estimate by the Miliken Institute.  The 
State Department also cites unofficial estimates of total economic losses at $2 trillion.  Department of  
State, International Information Programs, At-A-Glance: Global Terrorism, no. 1 (September 2002), < 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ataglance1.htm> (11/17/2003), Global War on Terrorism. 
22 GAO/NSIAD-97-254, 28-29. 
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documents reveals that prior to 9-11, there was no explicitly named counterterrorism 
strategy.  While significant, this doesn’t mean that a combination of directives and laws 
didn’t form a type of strategy.  The following section will examine what, if anything in 
the way of a coherent strategy was built on the foundation of PDDs-39, 62, and 63. 
 
2. A Counterterrorism Strategy as the Sum of Policies?  
Unfortunately, although much was done to combat terrorism by the executive and 
legislative branches prior to 9-11, the sum of these actions cannot be considered a 
strategy.  In their second report issued in 2000, the Gilmore Commission outlined their 
standards for a national counterterrorism strategy.  According to the commission, any 
strategy must be: national and properly resourced; must focus on deterrence, prevention, 
preparedness, and response; and needs to be based on requirements and be coordinated 
with authorities at the local, state, and federal levels.23  Federal efforts to combat 
terrorism failed to meet these standards during the pre-9-11 era.  As already discussed, 
there was no formal strategy and the policies that were implemented were not adequately 
resourced.  In most cases agencies given new counterterrorism roles or responsibilities 
were expected to meet these new challenges utilizing existing resources.  This was the 
case when the FBI stood up the NIPC.  The primary reason for this resourcing issue is the 
nature of the US government.  In general, the executive branch determines policy while 
the legislative branch authorizes and appropriates the funds needed to implement these 
policies.  The legislature can also pass laws imposing requirements on departments and 
agencies of the executive branch.  Agencies can sometimes avoid requirements imposed 
by Congress if funds were not allocated to support the requirements but, they are 
obligated to comply with executive directives using funds within their current budgets. 
Despite the lack of an over-arching strategy, federal efforts did address the tasks 
of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and response.  Deterrence was addressed in PDD-
39, and implemented through legal, diplomatic, and military means with limited 
effectiveness.  The FBI and Justice Department worked to successfully apprehend and 
                                                 
23 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Second Annual Report of the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (December 15, 2000), <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terr2.pdf> (July 2003), iv. 
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prosecute several terrorists responsible for attacks against US targets.  These included 
Ramzi Yousef, who was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, and four 
terrorists responsible for the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.24  
Diplomatic and economic sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism are tools that have 
been used to both deter and respond to terrorism.  Military efforts to deter and respond to 
terrorism include the cruise missile attacks against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.   
Domestic preparedness has probably received the most attention but is also the 
most problematic.  All three Clinton era PDDs dealing with terrorism specifically 
addressed preparedness against terrorist attacks.  Congress also addressed this issue with 
the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act in 1996, and other acts.25  While responding to terrorism 
abroad involves a relatively small group of agencies, preparing for attacks against the 
homeland involves dozens of federal agencies.  Most of these have tried to expand their 
influence and budgets in the name of counterterrorism.  Unfortunately there has been 
little or no linkage between legitimate threats and resources requested or expended.26  
This flaw is compounded by the failure of congressional committees to coordinate with 
each other when allocating funds to various counterterrorism programs advanced by 
federal departments and agencies.27  This has resulted in overlapping programs and the 
inefficient allocation of limited resources. 
Finally the policies and programs developed to combat terrorism were not based 
on requirements or effectively coordinated within or between the levels of government.  
The establishment of the national coordinator was an attempt to provide for coordination 
within the federal government but this was a doomed effort.  The coordinator lacked 
authority and control over budgets, and could not make policy changes.  The coordinator 
was limited to asking for the cooperation of the many agencies he was supposed to 
                                                 
24 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1999 
(Washington D.C.), 52. 
25 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve 
Counterterrorism Operations, GAO/NSIAD-99-135 (Washington, D.C.: May13, 1999), 5-6. 
26 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs, 
GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145 (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000), 1. 
27 General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk 
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163 (Washington, D.C.: September 
1999), 57. 
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orchestrate.28  In addition to his lack of authority, he also suffered from a limited 
mandate.  The national coordinator’s mandate only encompassed federal agencies and 
ignored the contribution of, and need to coordinate with state and local authorities. 
The limited mandate of the national coordinator illustrates a fundamental flaw of 
all federal planning to respond to terrorism and manage its consequences.  The 
government continuously focused on a top down approach to coordinate between federal 
agencies in responding to a worst-case scenario.  This is an outgrowth of an obsession 
with low-probability/high-consequence attacks that would automatically require a federal 
response.  Even accepting this scenario, this planning still ignores the fact that local 
responders will always be the first to arrive on-scene.  No matter what the scope of the 
incident, local authorities will always be the first responders and need to be integrated 
into government planning and preparation.  This is especially true for the statistically 
more important, high-probability/low-consequence attacks, which will not warrant a 
federal response.29  Fortunately there were some efforts to boost the capabilities of local 
first responders and to make information and expertise more readily available to them. 
There is consensus that the federal government lacked anything approaching a 
comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism or preparing the nation to manage the 
consequences of an attack.  Even as the executive and Congress created new programs 
and requirements aimed at fighting terrorism, there continued to be a near complete lack 
of integration and coordination. 
Despite the lack of a strategy and the disjointed nature of government programs 
not all efforts were wasted.  Several important terrorists were captured and brought to 
trial.  In the name of combating terrorism, focus was placed on infrastructure security, 
including our computer infrastructure.  This improved security against terrorists and the 
more prevalent hackers.  Finally the military became more involved in the fight against 
terrorism at home and abroad.  The military’s primary domestic role is still military 
support to civil authority (MSCA) but it has improved its preparation and capabilities in 
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this area and become more involved in sharing its unique expertise.  In the foreign arena, 
the military has worked to improve its ability to play an active role in the pursuit of 
terrorists. 
 
C. THE MILITARY AND COUNTERTERRORISM  
The military role in combating terrorism can be divided into two arenas; domestic 
and international.  The military always plays a supporting role during domestic 
operations.  This is due to both legal issues and the normal sequence of response to a 
terrorist incident.  Prior to a declaration of war, the military also plays a supporting role 
in combating international terrorism.  While the military would support a lead federal 
agency during domestic operations, during an international operation it would play the 
lead role.   
The military further divides its efforts to combat terrorism. The military defines 
counterterrorism as offensive actions taken to confront and defeat terrorists.  It defines 
antiterrorism as defensive measures taken to protect US personnel and facilities at home 
and abroad.  During the era prior to 9-11, the public role of the military was limited 
primarily to anti terrorism with a few highly publicized exceptions. 
This period represents a time of an increasing focus on combating terrorism and 
expanded roles and missions for the military.  This section will review the major 
unclassified roles the military played in combating terrorism during the Clinton era.    
The section will look at the domestic and international spheres separately.  First it will 
look at changes made to the chain of command in an effort to improve counterterrorism 
efforts.  It will then look at the expansion of roles and missions during this time period.  
Finally it will look at new assets and programs created to fulfill these new roles.  It will 
conclude by looking at the implementation of programs and operations against terrorists 
during this period. 
  
1. Domestic Operations 
Military roles in domestic counterterrorism support two major policy areas 
described in PDD-39.  These are vulnerability reduction, and response to and 
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management of the consequences of terrorist incidents.  During domestic operations 
military forces always remain under civilian control.  Although they may be employed at 
the discretion of the President, they are normally only deployed when requested by a 
governor.30  A governor may request federal military support once he believes he has 
exhausted all other means available. 
Prior to 1999, all approved requests for MSCA were passed to the Director of 
Military Support. (DOMS)  In 1999, the DOD established Joint Task Force-Civil Support 
(JTF-CS) under US Joint Forces Command.  JTF-CS was given responsibility for the 
planning and command and control (C2) of all consequence management support to civil 
authorities.  The DOMS retained responsibility for all other disaster and emergency 
response functions.31  This was supposed to improve military consequence management 
efforts by aligning them beneath a unified command.  Instead the decision created two 
parallel systems for MSCA and the potential for confusion.  In the immediate aftermath 
of an incident it is not always clear what the cause was.  In a 1999 report on issues to 
improve counterterrorism operations the Government Accounting Office (GAO) cited 
problems of conflicting guidance and the need for the DOD to clarify its structure for 
domestic support operations.32  These structural faults were not resolved prior to the 
attacks of September 11th.  A significant exception to this chain of command for civil 
support is the National Guard.  The National Guard is funded by the federal government 
but normally falls under state control during domestic operations.  If local and state 
resources prove inadequate and a governor requests federal assistance, then National 
Guard troops will be federalized and fall under the federal chain of command once the 
request s approved and federal forces are deployed.  Concurrent with the changes made to 
the command and control structure, changes were made to the domestic roles and 
missions of the military. 
                                                 
30 Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Crisis 
Management, RL30938 (April 19, 2001), 16-17. 
31Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, III. For Ray Downey: Third Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the 
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (December 15, 1999) <http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/index.html> (July 2003), 50. 
32 GAO/NSIAD-99-135, 9. 
21 
The military has a long history of limited involvement in domestic operations.  
The core domestic mission has always been to control and suppress rebellions, riots, and 
civil disturbances that exceeded the means of state and local authorities.  The military 
role also grew to include disaster assistance.  During the 1990s the military was directed 
to plan and organize for new domestic missions in support of government efforts against 
terrorism.  These new missions were assigned to the military based on the unique skills, 
assets and organization of the armed forces. 
The FBI, as the LFA for crisis management, saw four areas the military could 
assist in crisis and consequence management.  Under crisis management the military 
could provide technical support and it could aid in the interdiction and apprehension of 
terrorists.  Under consequence management it could aid in restoring law and order after 
an attack and it could assist in abatement of consequences. 33  In the case of technical 
support this could occur anytime civil authorities saw the need to tap unique military 
capabilities.  In the other three cases the military would remain a resource of last resort.  
Only one of these missions varied significantly from established military domestic 
support roles.  The provision of technical and material assistance was pioneered during 
the expansion of national counter drug efforts.  The restoration of law and order, and 
consequence abatement were traditional missions.  The one wild card was military 
assistance in interdiction and apprehension.  This was a significant change from military 
observation missions during counter drug operations.  Like traditional public order 
missions, these would be limited to cases where other state and federal assets such as the 
FBI hostage rescue team were overwhelmed.  Missions of this type would have to be 
authorized by the President under the insurrection statutes. 
Another new role assigned the military was the provision of training and training 
support to first responders.  The 1996 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act designated the DOD as 
the lead agency for enhancing domestic preparedness for attacks with WMD.  The DOD 
was directed to train and assist local, state, and federal agencies in preparing for terrorist 
attacks.34  
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In order to fulfill its new roles the military established several new programs and 
capabilities.  The DOD developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to enhance the 
readiness of state and local first responders.  It also created the National Guard WMD 
civil support teams (WMD-CST) and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident 
Response Force, (CBIRF) to improve its ability to respond to a terrorist attack with 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. (CBRN)   
The Army’s Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) was tasked 
with administering the domestic preparedness program.  Between June 1997, and 
September 1999 the program trained 19000 first responders from 67 cities.  The training 
program was turned over to the Department of Justice in October of 2000, but the army 
continued its training support mission.35  Training and operational support includes the 
provision of training packages and the maintenance of a chemical/biological hotline and 
helpline.  The hotline is tied into the National Response Center (NRC) to provide expert 
assistance to state and local authorities during emergencies.  The helpline stands alone to 
provide information and expertise during non-emergency situations.36  The WMD-CSTs 
and CBIRF were developed to provide on site assistance and expertise in support of first 
responders during WMD incidents. 
In 1998, ten National Guard WMD-CSTs were established to support local 
incident commanders in identifying chemical agents and developing response plans.  The 
planned total is 32 teams distributed to provide rapid response to all major metropolitan 
areas.  Each team consists of 22 members trained in explosive ordnance disposal, nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and medicine.  The members are full-time 
members of the National Guard.  The teams can operate across state lines and fall under 
the control of a governor unless the situation warrants the deployment of federal troops.37 
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In 1996, Marine Corps General Charles Krulak founded the CBIRF.  It is a 300 
man force with the capability to respond to CBRN incidents nationally.  It includes 
medical personnel, firefighters, ordnance disposal and NBC specialists.  As a federal 
force CBIRF would be employed after local and state capabilities, including WMD-
CSTs, were overwhelmed.38   
While most domestic military missions supporting counterterrorism operations are 
conceptually very similar to previous MSCA missions, practical experience in these 
operations was extremely limited during the pre-9-11 period.  The new missions and 
capabilities were not developed until 1997, and thankfully the US has yet to suffer a 
CBRN attack.  Military experience supporting responses to terrorist attacks in the US has 
been mostly limited to exercises.  The attacks against the federal building in Oklahoma 
City and the World Trade Center were conventional attacks and were handled locally 
with very little support. 
 
2. International Operations 
When PDD-39 outlined US policy for combating terrorism it included two areas 
in the international sphere where the military was expected to play a role.  The primary 
and interrelated roles for the military were deterrence and response.  Deterrence is based 
on delivering a strong and consistent message and maintaining the ability to respond 
quickly and decisively when challenged.  The military was directed to improve its 
counterterrorism capabilities to enhance our ability to deter and respond to the growing 
unconventional terrorist threat.  As a component of this, the military was also instructed 
to build up its counter-proliferation programs.  These directives forced some minor 
changes on the military.  These changes fell under the areas of command and control, 
roles and missions, capabilities, and operations. 
For an organization the size of DOD, the changes to the command and control 
structure were relatively minor but sent a clear message on the new importance placed on 
fighting terrorism.  In 1998, the Joint Staff established the Deputy Directorate for  
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 Combating Terrorism and further increased the resources dedicated to 
counterterrorism forces.39  In March 2001 the Secretary of defense designated the 
Secretary of the Army as the lead for homeland defense and counterterrorism.  The 
Secretary of the Army was later named as acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD-SO/LIC) in order to satisfy 
congressional requirements.  These requirements were established in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001.  They dictated that the Secretary of 
Defense designate an assistant secretary of defense as the senior civilian responsible for 
combating terrorism.  During this same time period a Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) for counterterrorism was established under the Special Operations Command. 
(SOCOM)40  Of these changes the most important for the preparation for and conduct of 
operations was the creation of the task force.  The other changes were more symbolic 
bureaucratic changes than concrete changes to the chain of command. 
There were no significant changes to the external roles and missions of the 
military in order to combat terrorism.  The military’s primary mission continued to be 
that of fighting and winning the nation’s wars.  In reality the definition of war was 
relatively loose and included the use of force in situations short of conventional war.  
Traditionally the military had maintained a broad spectrum of capabilities to support the 
policies and needs of the executive.  During war the military generally played a lead role 
but during peacetime it stood ready to support any agency or department of the federal 
government.  Normally it supported the President or the State Department but during the 
90s it began to provide support to the Department of Justice.  While its role did not 
change significantly, the military did work to enhance its unconventional capabilities 
during this period. 
During the 90s there were modest gains in conventional and counterterrorism 
military capabilities.  The creation of the joint task force did help focus planning and 
training to combat terrorism.  Also while the conventional forces were downsized, special 
operations forces were able to maintain the status quo.  During a time of declining 
                                                 
39 Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: 1998), 
Chapter 2. 
40Gilmore, III. For Ray Downey, 49. 
25 
defense budgets, special operations was one of the few areas to see an increase in 
funding. 
The decade prior to September 11th witnessed a relatively small but significant 
number of military counterterrorism operations.  These operations fell under two broad 
headings, conventional operations and special operations.  On August 20, 1998 the US 
Navy used cruise missiles to strike three targets in Afghanistan and a single target in 
Sudan.  The targets in Afghanistan were terrorist training camps run by Al-Qaeda.  The 
target in Afghanistan was part of a government run chemical plant suspected of 
producing chemical weapons.  These attacks were in response to the terrorist attacks 
against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.41  These attacks were the first 
time the US had used overt force against terrorists or their sponsors since Ronald Reagan 
ordered the bombing of Libya in 1986. 
The DOD has also admitted to four operations in support of the Department of 
Justice during 1997.  Special operations forces assisted the FBI in conducting four 
extraditions.  These extraditions led to the prosecution and conviction of terrorists 
responsible for attacks against US targets.  In keeping with Clinton policies, all of these 
conventional and special forces operations were carefully selected and justified under the 
nation’s right to self defense.  In general, the role of the military in combating 
international terrorists was limited prior to 9-11. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The US did not develop a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy prior 
to the attacks of 9-11.  Terrorism was considered a lower level threat that could be 
addressed through policy directives and normal law enforcement practices.  US 
counterterrorism policy was first formalized in 1986, when the Reagan administration 
issued National Security Decision Directive 207. (NSDD 207)  This directive focused on 
terrorist incidents overseas but addressed the need for interagency cooperation at home 
and abroad.  Priorities seemed to change in 1995, when President Clinton issued 
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Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) shortly after the bombing of a federal 
building in Oklahoma City.  PDD 39 outlined the new US policy on counterterrorism and 
formed the foundation of counterterrorism programs during the period leading up to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11.  US counterterrorism policy, as stated in PDD 39, was 
to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against US citizens, territory, or 
facilities no matter where they occurred.  The policy described terrorism as a criminal act 
and a potential threat to national security.   
The policy described four steps to be taken to ensure the US was prepared to 
combat terrorism at home and abroad.  These steps consisted of: reducing vulnerability, 
deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and developing the capability to detect, 
prevent, and manage the consequences of attacks employing WMD.  Reduction of 
vulnerability lacks focus and is expensive but straightforward.  Deterrence is supposed to 
be accomplished through the energetic pursuit of terrorists and their sponsors, and by 
convincing the world that terrorism will not change US policies.  The capability to 
respond to terrorist acts decisively supports deterrence.  Finally the policy places top 
priority on preventing terrorists from obtaining WMD capabilities. 
PDD 62 and 63, both issued in 1998 were intended to expand on PDD 39 and 
further clarify government policy for fighting terrorism.  PDD 62 established the National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.  PDD 63 calls 
for a national effort to protect the nation’s infrastructure.  This was the first directive to 
specify any concrete steps and assign deadlines.  The directive established the National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) within the FBI.  The center was chartered to 
provide warning and information, and to respond to attacks on the nation’s infrastructure.  
Both PDD-62 and 63 focus on infrastructure vulnerability to terrorist attacks.  They also 
focus primarily on the threat posed by terrorists using WMD or computer attacks.  
Essentially, the policies provide guidance for defending against terrorists, not fighting 
them.  Given this focus on defense there are still flaws in the policies.  First, the 
coordinator is not a cabinet-level position.  It has no bureaucratic powerbase and no 
budget of its own and while the coordinator can provide advice on budgets to 
departments and agencies, the position has no budget authority.  The final, most critical 
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flaw is the continued focus on vulnerability.  This focus, which began with PDD-39, 
ignores the difference between probable threats and potential but highly unlikely threats.   
PDDs-39, 62, and 63 represent the foundation of a national counterterrorism 
strategy but they are policy documents, not a strategy.  The question remains, was a real 
national strategy built on this foundation prior to 9-11. Unfortunately, although much was 
done to combat terrorism by the executive and legislative branches prior to 9-11, the sum 
of these actions cannot be considered a strategy.    
The Gilmore Commission outlined their standards for a national counterterrorism 
strategy.  According to the commission, any strategy must be: national and properly 
resourced; must focus on deterrence, prevention, preparedness, and response; and needs 
to be based on requirements and be coordinated with authorities at the local, state, and 
federal levels.  Federal efforts to combat terrorism failed to meet these standards during 
the pre-9-11 era and the policies that were implemented were not adequately resourced.  
In most cases agencies given new counterterrorism roles or responsibilities were expected 
to meet these new challenges utilizing existing resources.  Federal efforts did address the 
tasks of deterrence, prevention, preparedness and response. However, ultimately there is 
consensus that the federal government lacked anything approaching a comprehensive 
strategy for combating terrorism or preparing the nation to manage the consequences of 
an attack.   
The military role in combating terrorism can be divided into two arenas; domestic 
and international.  The military always plays a supporting role during domestic 
operations. However, during an international operation the Department of Defense 
(DOD) would normally play the lead role.  The military further divides its efforts to 
combat terrorism. The military defines counterterrorism as offensive actions taken 
against terrorists.  It defines antiterrorism as defensive measures taken to protect US 
personnel and facilities.  During the era prior to 9-11, the public role of the military was 
limited primarily to anti terrorism with a few highly publicized exceptions. 
During domestic operations active military forces always remain under federal 
civilian control.  While they may be employed at the discretion of the President, they are 
normally only deployed when requested by a governor.  A significant exception to the 
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chain of command for civil support is the National Guard.  The National Guard is funded 
by the federal government but normally falls under state control during domestic 
operations.  During the 1990s the military was directed to plan and organize for new 
domestic missions in support of government efforts against terrorism.   
The FBI, as the LFA for crisis management, saw four areas the military could 
assist in crisis and consequence management.  Under crisis management the military 
could provide technical support, and aid in the interdiction and apprehension of terrorists.  
Under consequence management it could aid in restoring law and order after an attack 
and it could assist in abatement of consequences.  Another new role assigned the military 
was the provision of training and training support to first responders.   
In order to support these missions the military established several new programs.  
The DOD developed the Domestic Preparedness Program to enhance the readiness of 
state and local first responders.  It also created the National Guard WMD civil support 
teams (WMD-CST) and the Marine Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response 
Force, (CBIRF) to improve its ability to respond to a terrorist attack with CBRN 
weapons. 
PDD-39 outlined US policy for combating terrorism and included two areas in the 
international sphere where the military was expected to play a role.  These roles were 
deterrence and response.  However, there were no significant changes to the external 
roles and missions of the military.  The military’s primary mission continued to be that of 
fighting and winning the nation’s wars.  The decade prior to September 11th witnessed a 
relatively small but significant number of military counterterrorism operations.  These 
operations fell under two broad headings, conventional operations and special operations.  
In 1998 the US Navy used cruise missiles to strike targets in Afghanistan and a target in 
Sudan.  These attacks were in response to the terrorist attacks against the American 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  Special operations forces also assisted the FBI in 
conducting four extraditions.  Despite these actions, the military role in combating 
terrorism was very limited. 
Clinton era counterterrorism policies were based on the criminality of terrorism 
and the primacy of law enforcement.  PDD-39 described the aims of US policies for 
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combating terrorism as deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against the US 
and its citizens.  While PDDs 39, 62, and 63 formed the foundation for a counterterrorism 
strategy, no integrated and resourced strategy was developed prior to 9-11.  Furthermore, 
while these policies allowed for the use of the military, in practice its role was limited.  In 
the US the military was expected to support civilian entities in conducting consequence 
management.  In the international arena the military was used sparingly to strike select 
targets from a distance.  Clinton era military operations were marked by a desire to use 
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III.  COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION AFTER 9-11 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The worldview of Bush is significantly different from Clinton’s, especially 
following the attacks on 9-11.  The Bush administration is dominated by realists who 
believe the world is a dangerous place and that power is the most important international 
currency.  Many of the goals and concepts in the Bush National Security Strategy remain 
unchanged from the Clinton strategy but the tone and focus illustrate a sea-change in 
attitude and outlook.  Where the Clinton strategy was focused on seizing opportunities 
while being prepared to defend against aggression, the Bush strategy is premised on 
confronting the terrorist threat and grasping opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, 
and liberty. 
The Bush strategy is built around three goals: political and economic freedom, 
peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.  The strategy is 
founded on the principle of human dignity and outlines seven action areas to achieve its 
three core goals.  The first three action items: strengthen alliances to defeat global 
terrorism, work with others to defuse regional conflicts, and prevent our enemies from 
threatening us or our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); are all directly or 
indirectly concerned with defeating the terrorist threat.42 
The preface to the Bush strategy sets the tone and leaves no doubts about the 
administration’s focus.  In the three pages of the preface there are thirteen references to 
terror and terrorists.  It also establishes its vision of the global framework of the war on 
terror.  The opening paragraph establishes the common duty of all people to protect the 
values of freedom against their enemies.  It continues by declaring “We will defend the 
peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.”  While the tone and focus are different these 
statements share common principles with the strategy of the previous administration.  
From the fourth paragraph on it becomes obvious that the new administration has been 
traumatized and has a new agenda.  Where the previous strategy focused on diplomatic 
                                                 
42 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America  (Washington, 
D.C.: September 2002), 1-3. 
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and law enforcement tools, the new strategy begins with a discussion of tools of military 
power and homeland defense.  This paragraph also declares the situation a “war against 
terrorists…”43   
Traditionally terrorism was considered a criminal act.  This meant that law 
enforcement agencies took the lead in dealing with terrorists while the military played a 
supporting role.  The use of military force was normally limited to crises beyond the 
capabilities of law enforcement, or more rarely, retaliatory strikes.  By redefining the 
struggle against terrorism as a war, the administration laid the foundation for a radical 
new approach to the problem.  The primacy of law enforcement had dictated a primarily 
reactive approach.  The declaration of a war opened up new possibilities for preemption. 
This new policy of preemption is accompanied by a harsher view of countries that 
tolerate or support terrorist organizations.  Where the previous administration relied on 
diplomatic pressure to curtail support for terrorists the Bush administration declared, “the 
allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.”44  This strategy coupled with US actions 
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, serves as a warning to traditional state supporters and 
sponsors of terrorism.  The sponsorship of terrorism will no longer be a safe or cheap 
means to advance national aims.  The Bush strategy is especially focused on state 
sponsors that possess or are pursuing weapons of mass destruction. (WMD) 
The Bush administration has identified “the crossroads of radicalism and 
technology”45 as the greatest threat facing the US.  The strategy establishes its focus on 
terrorist organizations with global reach, and terrorists and sponsors of terrorism that try 
to obtain WMD.  It uses the potential impact of an attack using WMD to justify the need 
for a policy of active defense and preemption.  In a major break from the past the strategy 
declares that “our best defense is a good offense,…”46 
Although offensive capability has always been a major component of deterrence it 
has generally been viewed as the ability to retaliate against an attacker.  The new strategy 
                                                 
43 Ibid. , i. 
44 Ibid. , ii. 
45 Ibid. , p. ii. 
46 Ibid. , 6. 
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is founded on taking preemptive action to defeat perceived threats before they can harm 
the nation.  The key issue of the new strategy is threat perception.  In taking a proactive, 
offensive stance, US actions are now based on broadly defined, perceived threats.  
Essentially, any government pursuing WMD or supporting terrorists anywhere may be 
declared a threat and attacked.  US strategy has abandoned the concept of reasonable 
doubt and adopted a policy of shooting first and verifying later.  The problem with 
perceived threats is their tendency to multiply and significantly outnumber both real 
threats and a nation’s ability to counter them.  Two years into the “Global War on Terror” 
(GWOT) this already seems to be happening. 
While the new National Security Strategy places significant emphasis on the 
threat posed by terrorism, it is not a counterterrorism strategy.  It is designed to guide all 
domestic and international actions toward securing and expanding America’s position 
and interests in the international system.  Beneath the overarching national security 
strategy the US develops subordinate strategies and policies to deal with significant 
challenges and threats.   
Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national 
counterterrorism strategy.  The traumatic events of 9-11 radically altered the national 
perception of the terrorist threat and the governments’ attitude towards the threat.  As 
evident in the National Security Strategy of 2002, the terrorist threat and the potential 
consequences of successful terrorist attacks have taken center stage in government 
planning.  However, this change in emphasis does not necessarily mean a change in 
strategy.  This chapter will examine the US strategies to combat terrorism following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  It will focus on the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism released in February 2003.  Given the number of government agencies and 
departments involved in the fight against terrorism, this chapter will focus on the roles, 
missions, and use of the military to combat terrorism and defend the homeland.  It will 





B.  COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY  
While the Clinton administration and its predecessors can be criticized for failing 
to develop a counterterrorism strategy, let alone a comprehensive and integrated one, the 
same criticism cannot be made of the Bush administration.  The Bush team has developed 
and begun to implement a plethora of strategies which directly and indirectly target 
terrorism and its enablers.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) has identified ten 
strategies that relate to combating terrorism.47  Some of these strategies deal specifically 
with terrorism while others cover broader issues but also affect terrorists.  For example, 
the National Strategies on Money Laundering and Drug Control are aimed at organized 
crime but have the potential to a significant role in counterterrorism. Distribution of 
illegal narcotics has become an important source of income for a variety of terrorist 
organizations.  This is especially true for organizations based in South America and Asia.  
Since most profits are made at the consumer end of the distribution chain, not the 
production end, money laundering is vital for the terrorists or criminals to be able to 
claim their profits.  Western banking laws and practices make it difficult to export large 
amounts of currency from a country.  Money laundering makes the extraction process 
safer and more reliable.  Both of these strategies help reduce the finances available to 
terrorist organizations. 
At first look the existence of multiple strategies concerned with combating 
terrorism would not indicate a comprehensive and integrated strategy.  In fact the 
existence of ten separate strategies purportedly aimed at fighting terrorism appears to 
signal the lack of an integrated strategy.  This section analyzes the relationships between 
the various strategies and the role they play in establishing a framework for combating 
terrorism.  The section also reviews the goals and objectives of the more significant 
strategies, especially those that have a potential impact on the structure, roles, and 
missions of the military. 
As discussed earlier, the National Security Strategy makes it clear that the 
administration considers terrorism to be the primary threat to US national security.  This 
strategy describes America’s national goals and establishes the over-arching framework 
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to align government plans and activities to accomplish these goals.  The remaining nine 
strategies are nested within this framework.  Directly supporting the National Security 
Strategy are the National Strategies for Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism. 
These two strategies provide the policy for the war on terrorism.  Despite some 
overlap, the National Strategy for Homeland Security deals primarily with defense 
against terrorist attacks within the US.  Conversely, the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism focuses on finding and defeating terrorists abroad.  Ideally there would be one 
strategy for dealing with terrorists everywhere.  Nevertheless, the division into domestic 
(defensive) and international (offensive) spheres is logical.  This is more apparent after a 
review of the roles of various government agencies when dealing with internal versus 
external issues.  The rest of the national strategies can be roughly divided based on 
whether they primarily support homeland security or the war on terrorism. 
There are three strategies which support the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism.  These are: the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
(Dec. 2002) the National Military Strategy of the United Stated, (Sept. 1997) and the 
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. (Oct. 2002)  The National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction contains an element of consequence 
management but is chiefly concerned with limiting the spread of WMD and related 
technologies.  The National Military Strategy describes current and future military 
capabilities requirements and the steps planned to meet these requirements.  The strategic 
plan for the war on terrorism is dedicated exclusively to finding and defeating terrorists 
that pose a threat to the US and its interests. 
The remaining four strategies mainly support the Homeland Security Strategy.  
The National Strategies to Secure Cyberspace, (Feb. 2003) and for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (Feb. 2003) both deal exclusively 
with homeland security.  The National Money Laundering Strategy (July 2002) was 
written primarily to combat organized crime within the US but has also been used to find 
and freeze the assets of terrorist organizations outside the US.48  The National Drug 
                                                 
48 The White House claims nearly $200 million in assets denied to terrorists since September 11, 2001.  
The White House, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: September 2003), 
6. 
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Control Strategy (Feb. 2002) is aimed at reducing drug use and drug related crimes 
within the US but has the potential to play a role in disrupting terrorist finances.  Its aim 
is to reduce demand, and to drive up the operating costs of traffickers by attacking the 
most vulnerable links in the transit chain. 
While the administration has issued a multitude of new strategies, they are 
hierarchical in nature and generally reinforce and complement each other.  They share 
themes with the higher-level strategies they support and tend to cross-reference each 
other.49  The top three strategies: the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism all set high level 
goals and objectives.  In general, the supporting strategies reference these and describe 
supporting goals and objectives that cover more specific functional areas.50   
Overall, the hierarchical structure and complimentary nature of the strategies 
provide for a comprehensive approach to fighting terrorism.  Some of the functional plans 
also include state and local players.  This combination of inclusiveness and cross-
referencing results in a generally integrated strategy.51  The major weakness is the lack of 
detailed performance measures.  Not all of the strategies establish desired end states or 
measurable outcomes.  Where they do describe end states, they generally fail to describe 
milestones that would indicate progress towards these goals.52  Given this shortcoming, 
the administration has made significant progress toward defining a comprehensive and 
integrated strategy for fighting terrorism at home and abroad. 
 
1.  National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism represents the single greatest 
break with past policies and approximations of counterterrorism strategies.  Where prior 
to 9-11 the focus was on preparedness and maintaining a credible response capability, the 
new strategy is one “of direct and continuous action against terrorist groups,…”  The 
strategy is more than an offensive strategy, it is a war strategy.  The opening paragraph 
                                                 
49 GAO-03-519T, 9. 
50 Ibid. , 2-3. 
51 Ibid. , 14. 
52 Ibid. , 16-17. 
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makes this clear when it refers to the attacks of September 11, 2001 as acts of war, not 
just against the US, but also against civilized society.  The strategy sets a lofty and open-
ended goal of a world in which people can live free of fear from terrorist attacks. This is 
an attractive concept for rallying allies but follow-through is unlikely.  The most probable 
course of events is for the US to engage allies to defeat the threats to the US and then 
withdraw to its natural state of limited international engagement.  The introduction makes 
another bold statement when it asserts that the advantage in this war belongs to the US, 
not the terrorists.  We have a decisive advantage in force but we have almost unlimited 
vulnerabilities and the terrorists maintain an advantage in intelligence that will be 
difficult to overcome.53  Following the rhetoric of the introduction the strategy gets to the 
meat of the argument with a discussion of the strategic intent. 
The intent describes the desired end state and four goals that support the 
achievement of the end state.  The intent is to stop terrorist attacks against all friendly 
nations and to create an inhospitable international environment for terrorists.  The four 
tenets of the strategy are defeat, deny, diminish, and defend.  The US plans to defeat 
terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, support, and finances.  It will deny 
sponsorship and support to terrorist organizations through pressure on nations that 
sponsor terrorists or tolerate their presence.  It seeks to diminish the conditions that create 
fertile recruiting grounds.  Finally the strategy plans to defend against attacks through 
preemption.54  The strategy then divides these four goals into a number of more specific 
supporting objectives. 
The first goal is to defeat terrorists and their organizations.  The focus is on 
attacking terrorists to reduce their capabilities and the scope of operations they can 
conduct.  Priority will be placed on organizations seeking WMD and those with global 
reach.  The strategy describes three objectives which will help accomplish this goal.  The 
US needs to identify, locate, and destroy the terrorists and their organizations.  The 
administration concedes that successful accomplishment of these goals will require 
improved intelligence and especially linguistic capabilities.  The destroy objective will 
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rest on three pillars: expanded law-enforcement efforts, focused military power and 
intelligence, and elimination of terrorist finances.  These three pillars form the prongs of 
an aggressive offensive strategy to destroy terrorist organizations everywhere.55 
The second strategic goal is to deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to 
terrorists.  The deny strategy is described as three-fold with an emphasis on preventing 
terrorists from obtaining CBRN weapons.  First, the strategy emphasizes state obligations 
under the international system to combat terrorism.  Second, it targets US assistance to 
states that lack the means to effectively fight terrorism.  Finally, it asserts US 
determination to force unwilling states to cooperate in the fight against terrorism.  The 
deny strategy is broken into five less than distinct objectives.  These are: end state 
sponsorship of terrorism, maintain international accountability regarding combating 
terrorism, strengthen and sustain international counterterrorism efforts, interdict and 
disrupt material support for terrorists, and eliminate terrorist sanctuaries.  The US will 
use a carrot and stick approach to convince countries to refrain from providing 
sponsorship and sanctuary.  The US will use law enforcement assets and military forces 
to interdict terrorist support.  Finally the US will use international conventions and 
treaties on terrorism combined with diplomatic pressure to force nations to do their part 
in the war on terror.  While the use of force is an explicit component of the interdiction 
objective, it is also implied throughout the discussion of the denial goal.56 
The third and most nebulous goal of the 4D strategy is that of diminishing the 
underlying societal conditions that terrorists exploit for recruiting.  This goal is split into 
two objectives, one relatively concrete and the other conceptual and essentially 
immeasurable.  The US will work with the international community to strengthen weak 
states and improve their abilities to provide for their people and control their territories.  
It also seeks to win the war of ideas by discrediting terrorism.57 
The final goal is to defend US citizens and interests.  While the title is defensive 
the text repeats the importance of a good offense.  This goal is divided into five 
objectives, two of which reference and are encompassed in the National Strategy for 
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Homeland Security and its subordinate strategies.  A third, attain domain awareness, is 
premised on information and intelligence sharing and integration.  The final two deal 
with the protection of US citizens and assets abroad, and the maintenance of an integrated 
incident management capability overseas.58 
 
2.  An Assessment  
The US has developed a relatively comprehensive and integrated counterterrorism 
strategy.  However, questions about this strategy remain.  Are its stated goals realistic and 
attainable?  Was the strategy built on a solid foundation?  Will this strategy succeed in 
the long run or make the situation worse?   This section will try to answer these questions 
for each of the four goals that make up the US strategy. 
 
a.  Goal: Defeat Terrorists and their Organizations 
The first goal of the US strategy is to defeat terrorists and their 
organizations.  The strategy or campaign is aimed at terrorism in general and does not 
target Al-Qaeda specifically.  The initial focus is on organizations with global reach and 
the intent and potential to obtain weapons of mass destruction but their defeat will not 
signal achievement of the goal.  The US strategy sets the lofty goal of defeating or 
helping to defeat all terrorist organizations.59  Despite the stated goal, it is highly likely 
that US commitment and aid will diminish significantly once those organizations that 
directly threaten US interests have been defeated or weakened sufficiently.  It is probable 
that US rhetoric was aimed at rallying international sympathy and support for the United 
States’ fight against terrorism.  As long as the US feels threatened and a local terrorist 
group can be associated with the threat to the US then aid will be forthcoming.  The fact 
is, the Bush administration is dominated by realists and the US will be very stingy with 
its resources in areas where it sees little or nothing to gain.  If we interpret the rhetoric 
and assume the real US concern is terrorist groups that pose a significant threat to 
America and its vital national interests, does that leave us with a more realistic goal? 
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Unfortunately, if we accept the administration’s standard of victory then 
the prospects are grim.  The strategy defines victory as “a world in which our children 
can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily 
lives.”60  This is setting the bar exceptionally high.  In a world of accelerating 
globalization and interconnection, any group anywhere in the world can attack the US.  
Essentially the US has defined victory as the defeat of every existing terrorist group and 
any that might emerge.  While defeat represents a clear goal with a concrete measure of 
victory it is not realistic.  At best the US can hope to reduce terrorist attacks to a tolerable 
level. 
The experiences of the British in Northern Ireland, the Spanish with 
ETA,61 and the Israelis with the Palestinians illustrate the difficulty of eliminating the 
terrorist threat.  In each of these cases, military force has been combined with limited 
reforms and concessions but the terrorists continue to operate after decades of struggle.  
While it is true that the threat has diminished in Spain and Great Britain/Northern Ireland, 
the same cannot be said for Israel.  In Israel, despite draconian measures, the threat has 
transformed and intensified.  Originally the Palestinian threat was limited primarily to 
rocket attacks and raids around the periphery of Israel but now the chief threat is suicide 
bomb attacks in Israel’s urban centers. 
A critical feature relevant to projecting an outcome for US efforts is the 
relatively local nature of the terrorist groups involved.  Although it is true that these 
groups have global or regional support networks, this support is generally limited to 
financial support and their recruiting bases are limited geographically.  The IRA recruits 
in the six counties of Ulster and finds some sanctuary in the Republic of Ireland.  ETA 
recruits in the Basque region of Spain and has traditionally found sanctuary in the Basque 
region of France.  The Palestinians recruit primarily in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
and find limited sanctuary in the surrounding Arab states.  In each case sanctuary is 
relatively limited and the terrorists live predominately within the same territories in 
which they operate.  In other words, the factor which defines these examples and sets 
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organization committed to an independent state through armed struggle. 
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them apart from the organizations the US seeks to defeat is that they live and operate in 
territory that the security forces occupy or have the ability to occupy.  The inability of 
these highly professional forces to eliminate terrorists in territories they control does not 
bode well for US efforts to defeat terrorist organizations scattered around the globe.  The 
US is in a situation where it needs the active and competent cooperation of nearly every 
country in the world to achieve its declared goal. 
For the US to have a realistic chance of accomplishing its defeat goal it 
must reduce the scope of the goal.  Even if the US decides to limit its goal to the 
destruction of Al-Qaeda the historical record doesn’t point toward success.  The battle 
against a terrorist organization is not a simple matter of applying force against the 
terrorists.  Physical defeat alone is not enough to end a terrorist campaign.  The campaign 
evolves based on the interplay of government policies, the cohesiveness of the terrorist 
group, and decisions made by the terrorist leadership.  The combination of these factors 
determines whether a terrorist campaign will decline or continue.  Physical defeat without 
organizational disintegration and the decision by remaining terrorists may reduce the 
level of violence but it is not sufficient to terminate the campaign.62  Nevertheless a 
terrorist victory is also unlikely.   
A stated goal of Usama bin Laden is to destroy the United States but this 
is all but impossible.63  There are very few examples of terrorist organizations achieving 
victory or having a significant political impact.64  In general, terrorists have had the most 
success in forcing an occupying power to leave.  There is no example of a terrorist 
organization with no domestic base of support toppling a system of government.  Given 
this, the US can’t lose but its likelihood of meeting its standard of victory is highly 
doubtful.  Concurrently there is great potential for the US to cause significant damage to 
its national interests in a blind pursuit of an impossible victory. 
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The defeat goal has been split into three subordinate and sequential 
objectives.  The US aims to identify, locate, and destroy terrorists and their organizations.  
It can be accepted as a given that the US has the forces to destroy any group that it can 
identify and locate.  The chief challenge confronting the US is obtaining the intelligence 
needed to identify and locate enough terrorists to eliminate their organizations.  Israeli 
efforts against Hamas have shown that the ability to identify and assassinate key leaders 
is not sufficient if your policies and actions continually create new terrorist recruits.  You 
need to be able to kill terrorists faster than you create them and that will be especially 
difficult for the US fighting in an open or global system. 
If the US has a weakness in its war on terror then that weakness is 
intelligence collection.  For decades the US focused its efforts on the Soviet Union and its 
resources on technical collection means.  With the end of the Cold War, intelligence 
budgets declined while the number of targets for collection exploded.  Furthermore 
satellite imagery and other expensive collection assets are of limited value in hunting 
terrorists.  At the same time advances in communications technology are outpacing the 
US signals collection capabilities and making it difficult to capture and process relevant 
signals intelligence in a timely manner.  The war on terror requires an emphasis on 
human intelligence (HUMINT) and analysis capabilities.65  Unfortunately, HUMINT was 
shorted resources in favor of technical collection means for decades prior to 9-11.66  
Trained analysts and field agents cannot be created overnight.  To compound the 
intelligence problem, analysis and exploitation of products of collection are limited by a 
critical shortage of qualified linguists.  A further weakness in the war on terror is 
targeting.  The Soviet Union provided a single target for resources to be focused on.  The 
US now faces numerous terrorist organizations that it knows little about and has trouble 
understanding.  Even if the US expands its HUMINT capabilities significantly, it can’t 
hope to penetrate every organization that may threaten the US.   
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The US has established a goal of defeating all terrorist organizations but it 
is starting with an intelligence deficit that will be difficult to eliminate, even through 
allied cooperation.  Even in going to war with Iraq, a country the US has been obsessed 
with for 10 years, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz admitted the decision was made 
based on fuzzy intelligence.67  Based on these intelligence shortcomings and the boost in 
recruiting that US offensive actions can expect to generate, success in defeating the 
terrorist threat will depend in large part on success in achieving the deny and diminish 
goals. 
 
b.  Goal: Deny Sponsorship, Support, and Sanctuary to Terrorists 
The second goal of US strategy is to deny sponsorship, support and 
sanctuary to terrorists.  This goal is broken into five objectives, the first of which is to 
end state sponsorship of terrorists.  While this objective will be difficult to achieve, it is a 
relatively limited objective.  When the strategy was published it listed seven state 
sponsors of terrorism but the war in Iraq has reduced this number to six.  Of these six, 
two, Cuba and Libya have curtailed their support in recent years.  The recent war in 
Afghanistan also sends a very clear message to the remaining sponsors that the US is 
willing to take drastic measures against states that sponsor terrorism. 
The second objective, establishing an international standard of 
accountability for combating terrorism, is critical to success but appears to be 
hypocritical window dressing.  The transnational terrorist organizations have a dual 
nature.  They groups threaten nations everywhere but every recruit or terrorist cell is 
based somewhere.  The organizations are both international and local at the same time.  
To win the war the US is dependent on the accumulation of local successes on a global 
scale.  The cooperation of traditional allies will not be sufficient for success. 
The US also needs the legitimacy that comes with international 
conventions and UN resolutions. (UNSCR 1373)  Despite its massive resources, the US 
cannot afford to sustain a global military effort alone.  While it needs every country to 
fight terrorism at home, it also needs the support of allies for major operations like those 
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in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This support is especially critical as operations in those 
countries grow in duration.68  This legitimacy is important for allied governments in 
justifying their support for the US to their electorates.  Furthermore, the same 
conventions that grant legitimacy to US actions also provide limited leverage for 
pressuring states that sponsor or tolerate terrorist organizations.       
While the US needs the legitimacy of international agreements, its 
newfound respect for the UN and contempt for terrorists everywhere appears 
hypocritical.  Many see US diplomatic efforts as an attempt to gain a veneer of legitimacy 
for any actions the US chooses to take and an attempt to get others to fight its battles.  
These critics can point to US support for numerous insurgencies against democratic 
governments in Central America.  Also, while the US demands that the countries 
everywhere end their sponsorship of terrorists and prevent their citizens from providing 
support, it is common knowledge that the US turned a blind eye to IRA fundraising in the 
US for decades.  At the same time the US uses international terrorism conventions to 
threaten state sponsors, it threatens to cut off assistance to its vassal states unless they 
sign a waiver granting US citizens immunity from the International Criminal Court. 
(ICC)69 
The third objective is to strengthen the international effort against 
terrorism.  Where the previous objective focused on strengthening the international 
framework for the war on terrorism, this objective is focused on convincing the strong, 
enabling the weak, and compelling the unwilling to work with us in the war on terror.  In 
many cases the aid to weaker countries is not new but is an expansion of aid previously 
targeted toward insurgencies.  The US has belatedly realized the interconnected nature of 
many of the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups.  These connections mean that groups 
previously considered to be local or regional are now seen as potential threats to the US.  
This objective is essential to overall US success.  The US cannot fight every battle and 
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without an international accumulation of local victories the US cannot expect to defeat 
transnational terrorist organizations. 
The objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuaries is closely tied to the 
previous objective.  Success will depend on a combination of US and international 
pressure and support.  Pressure must be applied to the countries that are capable of 
denying sanctuary but have chosen not to for various reasons.  In some cases these 
countries support terrorists based on ideology or in efforts to use the terrorists to advance 
their foreign policy goals.  Other countries tolerate the presence of terrorists as long as 
the terrorists do not conduct operations within the host country.  Basically sanctuary is 
provided in exchange for peace.  This was the case in Saudi Arabia with Al-Qaeda.  
Somewhat ironically, poor countries on the periphery which have received little aid in the 
past stand to gain from the war on terror.  A country that was previously ignored can now 
receive significant aid if it announces the presence of terrorists and its willingness to 
work with the US. 
Finally, the US aims to interdict and disrupt support for terrorists.  While 
the US cannot hope to interdict all support, as the war on drugs has shown, it can reduce 
the quantity of support and make its accumulation and distribution more difficult.  One 
issue that will make this task difficult is the relatively low level of material support 
required by a terrorist group.  Terrorists have little or no infrastructure and require 
minimal supplies of weapons.  Their greatest needs are recruits and money. The US will 
never be able to deny terrorist organizations new recruits.  This is due to two factors.  The 
first is that there will always be a certain level of discontent in the world and individuals 
capable of exploiting this.  As the lone superpower the US will continue to be a focus for 
this discontent.  Second, aggressive US military actions against Muslim nations during 
the war on terror will convince many that this is a holy war and generate new recruits for 
the terrorists. It will also be difficult for the US to significantly hurt terrorist 
organizations financially.  Despite US claims of having frozen nearly $200 million in 
terrorist finances, most terrorist organizations are not like governments and require 
relatively low levels of income.   
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The most important interdiction effort and the one with the best prospects 
for success is the area of weapons of mass destruction.  Compared to conventional 
weapons and explosives, WMD are limited in both the quantity available and the number 
of sources.  These limitations make the task of interdiction much easier.  While the 
interdiction of WMD should be easier it will not be a simple task.  Iraq provides both a 
positive and negative example of this.  UN weapons inspectors catalogued hundreds of 
tons of chemical and biological weapons that are currently unaccounted for.  The 
stockpiles cannot be found in Iraq and there is no evidence they were destroyed.  
Furthermore there would be little incentive for Iraq to destroy the weapons without 
informing the UN.  In light of US justification of the invasion of Iraq largely for the 
purpose of removing the threat of WMD, Hussein had good reason to use these weapons 
or to distribute them to terrorists.  While it is disturbing that the stockpiles are 
unaccounted for, the fact that neither the Iraqi resistance nor any other foreign terrorist 
organizations have employed these weapons is a very good sign.  The fact that Iraq hasn’t 
shared its stockpiles with other organizations is an indicator of a very strong and general 
reluctance among the owners of WMD to share them with groups they cannot control.70  
If any regime had a reason to use these weapons and little to lose, it was Iraq.  Its 
reluctance is a signal that other countries with better international relations and more to 
lose will have even less of an incentive to use or share these weapons.  If terrorists were 
to use a mass-produced WMD, its source could be quickly narrowed to a very short list of 
countries that would be sure to face the wrath of the US.  Despite the focus on this threat, 
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c.  Goal: Diminish the Underlying Conditions that Terrorists Seek to 
Exploit 
The next and least realistic goal is to diminish the underlying conditions 
that terrorists exploit.  While many terrorist foot soldiers are both poor and poorly 
educated this is not as important as it is generally believed.  The case of the 9-ll hijackers 
illustrates the fallacy of focusing on poverty.  The attackers were generally well educated 
and 15 of the 19 were Saudis, which eliminates personal poverty as a motivating factor.  
In a thorough study of terrorist movements, Hewitt has shown that there is no connection 
between an established terrorist organization and economic conditions.72  This goal of 
eliminating the root causes of terrorism is based on two objectives; the strengthening of 
weak states, and winning the war of ideas. 
It is true that weak states are sources of instability and have difficulty 
controlling their territories and borders but strong democratic states are not sufficient to 
eliminate terrorism.  Democracies by nature are not tightly controlled societies and will 
always provide some political space for terrorists to organize and operate.  Also, while a 
very strong state can eliminate terrorism within its borders, US support of a non-
representative strong state can create new terrorists elsewhere.  The US supported many 
authoritarian states in Central and South America and while this support didn’t lead to 
terrorist attacks against the US, it did send a message.  That message was that democracy 
and civil-rights weren’t too important as long as you were anti-communist.  This message 
may agree with realist theories of international relations but it conflicts with the image 
the US tries to project to the people of the world.   
There are signs that this contradiction in stated beliefs and policy actions 
continues today.  The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states the importance 
of good governance, the rule of law, and good civil-military relations but some US 
statements and actions contradict these noble words.  In an interview with CNN Turk, 
Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz criticized the Turkish military for not playing a 
strong enough leadership role in failing to convince parliament to allow US troops to pass 
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through Turkey.73  He aimed these comments at a secular democracy and NATO member 
where the military has a long history of involving itself in politics.  This appears to be 
another example of the attitude that democratic ideals are great as long as they don’t get 
in the way of US interests.  This is the same hypocritical attitude that stirs hatred of the 
US throughout the world.  The US claims to be the champion of democratic ideals but the 
rhetoric is forgotten as soon as a democracy feels it has the right to disagree with US 
policies.  Public statements like these do significant damage to the US objective of 
winning the war of ideas.  While most of the world (including Muslims) supports 
American political and economic ideals, US actions have increased anti-Americanism.  
The war in Iraq is a significant issue in global attitudes towards the US.  It has led to 
decreased support for the war on terrorism and the belief that the US is not a stabilizing 
influence in the Middle East.74 
The US hopes to diminish the conditions that support terrorism by 
spreading democracy and its values throughout the world but this may actually be 
counterproductive, especially in the Arab world.  While it may improve social and 
economic conditions, the imposition of US values is another type of change and another 
victory of Western culture over Arab culture and Islam.  There is no convincing link 
between poverty and terrorism.75  Nonetheless, there is a strong link between Western 
cultural dominance and military attacks on Muslim states, and Islamic fundamentalist 
hatred of the US.76 
There are two major sources of friction between the developing world and 
the US as the symbol of the modern world.  These are Western cultural dominance and 
the rapid pace of change globalization has forced on their cultures.  As mentioned 
previously poverty doesn’t appear to be a deciding factor.  While all terrorists are not 
Arabs or Muslims, the Arab case provides a representative example for several reasons.  
Islamic fundamentalism is a major problem and Al-Qaeda represents fundamentalist 
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interests.  In addition, Usama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 terrorists responsible for 9-11 
were Saudi citizens.   
For Arab terrorists there are two key issues at the core of their hatred.  The 
first is Islamic fundamentalism and the world-view it entails.  The Saudi state was 
founded by the Wahabi, a tribe from central Arabia with fundamentalist beliefs.  Even as 
oil has brought wealth and modernization, the fundamentalists have maintained 
dominance over the education and religious lives of the kingdom’s inhabitants.  
Fundamentalists see themselves as followers of the one true religion and any influence or 
dominance by unbelievers as blasphemous.77  The other issue is rapid cultural 
disintegration and the social and psychological impacts of that process.  In a matter of a 
few decades Arabia endured as much change as Europe between the Middle Ages and the 
present.  The discovery of oil and the arrival of mechanization destroyed the basis of the 
Bedouin economy and tribal culture.  The once dominant tribes no longer had anything of 
value to the villagers for trade and the desert ceased to provide them refuge from 
government control.  The growth of government control eliminated the anarchy that had 
formed the basis for tribal law and discipline.  The Arab tribes lost both their social 
structure and their way of life.78 
Although oil, globalization, and Western influence have led to significant 
cultural and social disintegration, some traditions live on and will make US objectives 
harder to achieve.  The Arab tribal structure is weakened but still carries forward some 
important cultural norms that are in direct contrast with the norms the US is advancing in 
its war of ideas.  The US seeks to deligitimate terrorism and promote human rights and 
the rule of law but these conflict with some norms of tribal culture.79  Slavery was an 
accepted practice among the tribes during the first half of the 20th century.  Tribal raids 
survived into the second half of the century and blood feuds are still practiced.80 
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The US may be able to improve living conditions for many but some of 
these same actions will motivate others to take up arms against the US and everything it 
represents.  The US expects to diminish the causes of terrorism through the spread of 
Western values, culture, and economic prosperity.  These are the same things that 
fundamentalists are using to rally recruits to their cause.  In a way the US is trying to 
fight an anti-globalization movement through globalization. 
 
d.  Goal: Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests at Home and Abroad 
The final goal in the US strategy is to defend American citizens and 
interests at home and abroad.  Essentially this goal is a limited restatement of the 
homeland security strategy with the additional objectives of protecting personnel and 
facilities abroad and maintaining the ability to project a consequence management 
capability.  This goal also reiterates the offensive theme of the overall strategy when it 
states that the best defense is a good offense.81 
The goal is broken into four distinct objectives.  The first, implement the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security won’t be discussed here.  The second, attain 
domain awareness is consistent with the general need for improved intelligence in order 
to conduct effective offensive and defensive operations.  Included in this objective is 
improved border controls over the flow of people and goods.  The US will never be able 
to achieve complete control over its borders but there is room for significant 
improvement.  Control of the borders has been in the hands of three separate 
organizations with incompatible computer systems.  At the same time intelligence has 
tended to be “stove-piped” and lacking in integration.  Ongoing improvements in these 
two areas will not stop all terrorist attacks but will significantly improve US defenses.  
The last two objectives are concerned with defense against terrorism abroad. 
First, the government wants an integrated system to protect Americans 
abroad.  The core of this objective is providing better threat information to citizens 
abroad, coupled with a stronger law enforcement presence in appropriate nations.  This 
objective will probably see minimal effort and achieve little.  US intelligence agencies 
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are consistently criticized for failing to share information amongst themselves.  It is 
unlikely that they will attain advanced warning of an attack against a specific individual 
or company.  It is even more unlikely that they would risk a source to warn an individual.  
Even if better information provides better generic threat warnings for cities or countries, 
these warnings won’t be heeded by all or most Americans abroad.  The homeland 
security warning system is a good example of the problem.  During most of the summer 
of 2003 the threat level was “elevated” but because it never changed and no attacks 
occurred, the warning lost its meaning. 
The final objective of providing an integrated incident management 
capability is a realistic objective.  The Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST) 
already provide the core capability.  The military also has numerous assets that if not 
specifically tailored to the mission as CBIRF is, still have capabilities that would be 
critical in supporting an incident response team.82   
Overall the new strategy is a huge step forward.  While many of the goals 
and objectives appear unattainable, they do provide a focus and targets to strive for.  The 
strategy provides a framework and priorities for US counterterrorism efforts.  The US 
may never achieve most of these goals but progress towards them will still be beneficial 
for US security.  Although this strategy provides a solid framework for counterterrorism 
efforts, in the end it is only a document. Success in the war on terrorism depends on 
implementation of the strategy.  Victory doesn’t necessarily require this strategy but it 
does require a strategy and this strategy supposedly represents the best ideas from the 
best minds in the administration.  The following section will review significant actions 
taken by the military in the war on terrorism.  It will use the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism to place these actions in context.  It will also evaluate how these 
actions fit the strategy and contribute to success against terrorists. 
 
C.  MILITARY COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS  
 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush declared a global 
war on terrorism.83  This marked a turning point in the American treatment of terrorists 
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and terrorist organizations.  It also marked the beginning of a period of aggressive 
employment of all components of the US military at home and abroad that is expected to 
continue into the foreseeable future.  The military is playing a significant role in the 
pursuit of most of the goals that make up the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.  
This section will look at the actions taken by the US military during the war on terror.  
These actions will be discussed under the four major goals of the strategy.  In some cases 
an action may advance more than one goal simultaneously.  In others an action may 
support one goal and then another sequentially. 
 
1.  Defeat Terrorists and their Organizations   
The most significant US action aimed at the defeat of terrorists to date was the 
invasion of Afghanistan.  On October 7, 2001, the US began the military phase of the war 
against terrorism when it launched attacks against Afghanistan as part of Operation 
Enduring Freedom.84  US forces ousted the Taliban regime and eliminated Afghanistan 
as a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda.  Actions in Afghanistan killed a significant number of Al-
Qaeda fighters and key leaders.  In addition to denying sanctuary, these operations have 
disrupted the Al-Qaeda training and support infrastructure, making large-scale operations 
much more difficult in the near-term.  While major combat operations in Afghanistan 
have ended, US forces continue to search the countryside for Usama bin Laden and Al-
Qaeda operatives.  They are also assisting the new Afghan government in suppressing a 
resurgence of Taliban forces. 
US operations in Afghanistan shocked the world and achieved complete strategic 
and tactical surprise.  US action destroyed the Taliban and dealt a major blow against Al-
Qaeda. The US has taken away a sanctuary, captured and killed a large number of 
terrorists and destroyed huge stockpiles of weapons and supplies.  Operations against Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan were a tactical success and have seriously disrupted but have not 
eliminated the organization’s ability to conduct operations.  US operations in Afghanistan 
continue to tie down 9000 American soldiers and the long-term contribution to success in 
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the war on terror is yet to be seen.85  It will also take time before the implications of US 
actions become clear. 
 
2.  Deny Support, and Sanctuary  
The US is conducting one major operation and a number of smaller operations in 
support of this goal.  The largest operation to date to eliminate state sponsors of terrorism 
is Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In cataloguing its successes the US government also 
includes Afghanistan as a successful action to deny terrorists sanctuary.  In addition to 
these major operations the US has also deployed combat troops in the Philippines, 
Georgia and Yemen.  US troops in these countries are acting primarily as trainers to 
enhance the capabilities of local forces to conduct counterterrorism operations.86  US 
forces in Djibouti are part of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. (CJTF-HOA)  
This task force was deployed to support and conduct counterterrorism operations in the 
Horn of Africa region.87  The task force is composed of about 1800 US personnel plus 
allies.88  Since Afghanistan has already been covered, and will be covered again later, 
this section will focus on Iraq. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched on March 19, 2003.  As of April 3, there 
were forty-nine countries committed to the coalition although US briefings tend to focus 
on the much larger number of countries supporting the wider war on terror.89  The US has 
committed and maintained roughly 130,000 ground troops in Iraq.90  The US led this 
coalition against Iraq for the stated purpose of removing Sadam Hussein and eliminating 
Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.  Initial operations were extremely 
successful and the regime was quickly toppled.  Since then, a resistance movement, 
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which includes some foreign fighters, has emerged and Iraq is now considered the central 
front in the war on terror.   
The inclusion of Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of the war on terror is based on 
several points.  First, Iraq was labeled as a state sponsor of terrorism by the State 
Department.  Second, the US claims that Iraq posed a threat to the security of the United 
States and the world, not just the region.  The US also cites Iraq’s WMD programs and 
ties to Al-Qaeda, which was pursuing a WMD capability. 
Operations in Iraq have succeeded in eliminating a state sponsor of terror and a 
sanctuary for Ansar al-Islam, a new terrorist group that has been tied to Al-Qaeda and 
planned poison attacks in Europe.91  However, despite plans to drastically reduce the 
presence of ground troops once major combat operations were completed, escalating 
resistance has resulted in the continued maintenance of over 100,000 troops in Iraq.  The 
US has been forced to extend tours in Iraq from six months to one year and institute a 
rotation system.  
 
3.  Diminish Conditions that Terrorists Exploit 
The military role here is limited mainly to civic action programs conducted 
wherever US combat troops are deployed.  These efforts are concentrated in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where the military is playing a major role in reconstruction efforts.  In 
particularly weak or devastated countries these efforts fall under the heading of nation 
building.  Something the administration had claimed that the US would no longer do. 
These missions do not generate a significant drain on US forces since they are 
only conducted where the US already has a major presence.  At the same time the 
contribution these actions make toward the war on terror are highly debatable.  There is 
no doubt that they benefit local communities and generate good will toward the US.  The 
problem is good will is not the same thing as cooperation or support.  In the absence of 
security the local population will support or at least not hinder insurgent forces hostile to 
the US.  Also, while the previous governments of Afghanistan and Iraq sponsored and 
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provided sanctuary for terrorists, these nations generally did not provide significant 
numbers of recruits for Al-Qaeda.  The countries where the US is working hardest to 
diminish conditions that promote terrorism are also the countries in which US efforts to 
defeat terrorism caused the most disruption and motivation for potential terrorists.  The 
US appears to be its own worst enemy in the war against terror. 
 
4.  Defend U.S. Citizens and Interests  
The military role in homeland security changed significantly as the attacks of 9-11 
happened.  The Air Force and Air National Guard began flying combat air patrol 
missions (CAP) over major US cities within hours of the attacks.  The purpose of these 
patrols was to shoot down any civilian aircraft that was deemed a threat to people on the 
ground.  By October, thousands of National Guardsmen were patrolling America’s 
airports while others were on duty at major federal facilities and critical infrastructure 
sites.  The number of reservists on active duty supporting homeland defense reached 
almost 60,000 by December 12, 2001.92  
The guardsmen serving in the nation’s airports were requested by the President, 
funded through the Federal Aviation Administration, and activated by the state governors 
to serve under Title 32 USC.  Their activation under Title 32 avoided the complications 
of the Posse Comitatus Act93 and enabled them to perform law enforcement duties in 
most states.94  Later when guardsmen were mobilized to augment border security forces 
they were activated in a federal status under Title 10.  Activation under Title 10 delayed 
their deployment by months as legal issues associated with Posse Comitatus were sorted 
out.  There was also the complicated issue of chain of command.  For the airport mission 
soldiers served within their home states under the command of their governors.  For the 
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border mission soldiers worked for various federal border control agencies within their 
home states but needed to fall under a federal military chain of command.  The problem 
was there was no combatant command responsible for operations within the US.  Also 
despite the numerous administrative headquarters in the US, these weren’t organized or 
staffed to command or support troops scattered along the nation’s periphery.  These 
issues were eventually worked out but it was a slow process and painfully inefficient 
when compared to the airport security mission.  Where troops were deployed to the 
airports almost overnight, it took months to get soldiers on the border. 
Although it may not have been a direct result of the lessons of the border security 
mission the DOD made a major change to its Unified Command Plan.  The DOD 
established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which began operations on October 
1, 2002.  NORTHCOM is a joint combatant command with responsibility for the entire 
United States and its air and sea approaches.  The purpose behind NORTHCOM was to 
strengthen the organization and capabilities for providing military support to civilian 
authorities (MSCA) and to eliminate gaps between military organizations with homeland 
security responsibilities.95  Prior to the establishment of NORTHCOM there were two 
offices responsible for MSCA.  If military assistance was required to manage a natural 
disaster then the director of military support (DOMS) was responsible.  If the emergency 
was terrorism related then Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS) was responsible.  
The creation of NORTHCOM rationalized this system but at the cost of an additional 
major command.  There are also some questions about the implications of a combatant 
command oriented on operations in the US. 
 
D.  CONCLUSIONS   
Prior to the attacks of 9-11, the US did not have a comprehensive national 
counterterrorism strategy.   The latest National Security Strategy makes it clear that the 
administration considers terrorism to be the primary threat to US national security.  This 
strategy describes America’s national goals and establishes the over-arching framework 
to align government plans and activities.  The National Strategies for Homeland Security 
and Combating Terrorism directly support the National Security Strategy.  These two 
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strategies provide the policy for the war on terrorism.  Despite some overlap, the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security deals primarily with defense against terrorist attacks 
within the US, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on finding 
and defeating terrorists abroad.  The National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism all set high level 
goals and objectives.  In general, the supporting strategies reference these and describe 
supporting goals and objectives that cover more specific functional areas. The major 
systemic weakness is the lack of detailed performance measures.       
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism sets a lofty end state of a world 
where people can live free of fear from terrorist attacks.  The intent is to stop terrorist 
attacks against all friendly nations and to create an inhospitable international environment 
for terrorists.  The four tenets of the strategy are defeat, deny, diminish, and defend.  The 
US plans to defeat terrorists by attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, support, and 
finances.  It will deny sponsorship and support to terrorist organizations through pressure 
on nations that sponsor terrorists or tolerate their presence.  It also seeks to diminish the 
conditions that create fertile recruiting grounds.  Finally the strategy plans to defend 
against attacks through preemption. 
The first goal of the US strategy is to defeat terrorists and their organizations.  
The initial focus is on organizations with global reach and the intent and potential to 
obtain weapons of mass destruction.  The US strategy sets the lofty goal of defeating or 
helping to defeat all terrorist organizations.  While defeat represents a clear goal with a 
concrete measure of victory, it is not realistic.  At best the US can hope to reduce terrorist 
attacks to a tolerable level. 
The experiences of the British in Northern Ireland, the Spanish with ETA, and the 
Israelis with the Palestinians illustrate the difficulty of eliminating the terrorist threat.  
The factor, which defines these examples, is that they live and operate in territory that the 
security forces occupy or have the ability to occupy.  The inability of these highly 
resourced efforts to eliminate terrorists in territories they control does not bode well for 
US efforts.  The US has established a goal of defeating all terrorist organizations but it is 
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starting with an intelligence deficit that will be difficult to eliminate and intelligence is 
the foundation of any counterterrorism effort. 
The second goal of US strategy is to deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to 
terrorists.  The recent war in Afghanistan also sends a very clear message to the 
remaining sponsors that the US is willing to take drastic measures against states that 
sponsor terrorism.  The US also aims to interdict and disrupt support for terrorists.  The 
difficulty is their greatest needs are recruits and money, and are relatively modest. If the 
US continues to conduct large wars against Muslim nations it will act as a recruiter for 
radical Islamic terror groups.  The most important interdiction effort and the one with the 
best prospects for success is the interdiction of WMD.  Compared to conventional 
weapons and explosives, WMD are limited in both the quantity available and the number 
of sources.  This task is simplified by an apparent reluctance of states to share their 
WMD with terrorists. 
The next and least realistic goal is to diminish the underlying conditions that 
terrorists exploit.  This goal is based on two objectives; the strengthening of weak states, 
and winning the war of ideas.  Weak states are sources of instability but strong 
democratic states are not sufficient to eliminate terrorism.  Democracies by nature are not 
tightly controlled societies and will always provide some political space for terrorists to 
organize and operate.  Efforts to eliminate poverty, while noble, will have little impact on 
terrorism.  There is no convincing link between poverty and terrorism.  Also as long as 
America attacks Muslim nations in the name of the war on terror it will never win the war 
of ideas.  Muslims admire our ideals but they are angered by US actions. 
The final goal in the US strategy is to defend American citizens and interests at 
home and abroad.  This has meant an expanded role for the military at home and 
significant reorganization of its command structure.  Overall the new strategy is a huge 
step forward.  While many of the goals and objectives appear unattainable, the strategy 
provides a framework and priorities for US counterterrorism efforts.   
The new strategies for fighting terrorism have been implemented with urgency 
and aggression that were not apparent before 9-11.  Following the attacks of September 
11, 2001, President Bush declared a global war on terrorism.  This marked the beginning 
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of a period of aggressive employment of all components of the US military at home and 
abroad that is expected to continue into the foreseeable future. 
The most significant US action aimed at the defeat of terrorists to date was the 
invasion of Afghanistan.  US forces ousted the Taliban regime and eliminated 
Afghanistan as a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda.  Actions in Afghanistan killed a significant 
number of Al-Qaeda fighters and key leaders.  However it is unclear how many of the Al-
Qaeda personnel killed were actual terrorists and how many were just mujahideen 
supporting the Taliban.  US operations in Afghanistan continue to tie down 9,000 
American soldiers and the long-term contribution to success in the war on terror is 
debatable.  US operations denied a safe-haven but that has never eliminated a terrorist 
group. 
The largest operation to eliminate a state sponsor of terrorism is Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  The US has committed and maintained roughly 130,000 ground troops in Iraq. 
The US invaded Iraq for the stated purpose of removing Sadam Hussein and eliminating 
Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.  US officials have declared Iraq the 
central front in the war on terror and operations in Iraq have succeeded in eliminating a 
state sponsor of terror and a sanctuary for Ansar al-Islam.  These accomplishments are 
not significant in the US war on terror but may serve a larger purpose in stabilizing the 
region.  Iraqi sponsorship was relatively limited and Ansar al-Islam was a fairly small 
group mostly limited to action in the Kurdish region of Iraq.  Escalating resistance has 
resulted in the continued maintenance of over 100,000 troops in Iraq and regional 
stability appears a long way off.   
The military role in diminishing conditions conducive to terrorist recruitment is 
limited mainly to civic action programs conducted wherever US combat troops are 
deployed.  These efforts are concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan where the military is 
playing a major role in reconstruction efforts.  The contribution these actions make 
toward the war on terror are highly debatable.  The previous governments of Afghanistan 
and Iraq did sponsor and provide sanctuary for terrorists.  However, these nations 
generally did not provide significant numbers of recruits for Al-Qaeda.  The benefits US 
aid and reconstruction efforts provide pale in comparison to the damage done by US 
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actions in the name of the fight against terrorists.  In order to stop a sponsor and Al-
Qaeda, the US has invaded two Muslim countries.  Instead of winning the war of ideas, 
the US is now seen by many as a threat to peace.  The US appears to be its own worst 
enemy in the war against terror. 
The military role in homeland security changed significantly following the attacks 
of 9-11.  The Air Force and Air National Guard began flying combat air patrol missions 
(CAP) over major US cities within hours of the attacks.  One problem discovered as 
security efforts expanded was the lack of an appropriate command structure.  Despite the 
numerous administrative headquarters in the US, none were organized or staffed to 
command or support troops scattered along the nation’s periphery.  The DOD made a 
major change to its Unified Command Plan  when it established U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) which began operations on October 1, 2002.  NORTHCOM is a joint 
combatant command with responsibility for the entire United States and its air and sea 
approaches.  NORTHCOM is now responsible for all military support to civil authorities. 
The Clinton administration created the foundation of the current strategies for 
combating terrorism.  Many of the principles behind the current strategies are the same 
developed under Clinton.  There have been two major changes under Bush.  These were 
the result of the trauma of the 9-11 attacks.  First, the administration has designated 
terrorism as the primary threat to the nation’s security.  Second, the Bush administration 
finally tied all of the policies and strategies together in a relatively comprehensive 
strategy.  Finally, Bush has taken a much more aggressive approach to the threat in which 
military force has replaced the traditional primacy of law enforcement. 
While the development of a comprehensive strategy is a positive step, other 
actions taken by Bush will have serious implications.  While the invasion of Afghanistan 
was cathartic, its effectiveness in contributing to the elimination of terrorism was limited 
and very expensive.  The connection between terrorism and the invasion of Iraq is weak 
but the fight against terrorism has been used to justify the invasion.  The impact of this is 
invasion on the elimination of terrorism will probably be very negative.  In addition to 
limited effectiveness these actions are already affecting the US military and will have 
lasting implications. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT STRATEGY AND ITS 
EXECUTION FOR THE MILITARY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze the implications of US strategy for the military and its 
relations with society, and the prospects for at least a limited victory against terrorism.  
Numerous authors have already tried to judge the level of US success for a variety of 
reasons.  Their reasons include: political agendas for and against the current 
administration, the liberty versus security scorecard, and the debate on whether the war 
will have an end.  As the presidential election approaches both parties are trying to use 
the war on terror and especially the massive involvement in Iraq in their campaigns.  Of 
longer term significance is the liberty versus security scorecard.  Americans have already 
given up substantial civil liberties in the name of the war on terror.  However, it has yet to 
be shown that the loss of liberty has resulted in improved security.  Concrete progress in 
the fight against terrorists would bolster the position of Attorney General Ashcroft and 
others who see the need for even more sacrifices.  For some it is irrelevant whether this 
progress is due to military operations or law enforcement, progress towards the ends 
justifies all means.   Finally, by calling this fight a war the President invoked the imagery 
of a decisive victory that will signal the defeat of terrorism and the end of the war.  While 
he admitted that the road to victory would be long, he never admitted that failure was a 
possibility.  Despite the desire to measure progress this war has been fought for just over 
two years it is much too early for anything other than speculation. 
The current “Troubles” in Northern Ireland have lasted over 30 years.  Terrorism 
related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict began with the establishment of Israel and has no 
end in sight.  The successful Italian campaign against the Red Brigades lasted 14 years 
from 1968 to 1982.  Seventeen years after the government declared victory, the Brigades 
made a comeback in 1999.96  In each of these cases the fight was against a narrowly 
defined group in a relatively limited geographic area predominately under the control of 
the counter terrorist forces.  This is not the case with the US and its current “global war 
                                                 
96 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 1 (1991): 
77. 
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on terrorism.”  Even if the discussion is limited to the fight against Al-Qaeda, the 
geographic scope dwarfs those of all other terrorist conflicts.  Given that these limited 
conflicts have dragged on for decades, it is foolish to expect significant progress against a 
disciplined, global organization in two short years. 
It is also shortsighted to focus on the relatively limited question of winning or 
losing when the fight itself may have much wider implications for the US and its position 
in the world.  In fact, the inflation of the fight against Al-Qaeda into a war against terror 
may be a mistake that will magnify the impact of US policies and actions.  If the US is 
not careful in its conduct of this global war it may win all the battles and lose the war.  In 
reality, the prospect of victory under the broad terms defined by the President is unlikely. 
Victory would be possible and more likely if the President had declared war on a 
single organization such as Al-Qaeda.  However even in that limited case, the historical 
record doesn’t support the likelihood of success.  While terrorists have a very poor track 
record of victory, they are surprisingly resilient.97  In the terms of victory framed by 
Bush, the terrorists only need to survive and remain somewhat active to deny the US 
victory.  The terrorists’ goals are irrelevant.   
President Bush has declared that terrorists represent a threat to our way of life.  
This is only true if US policies and actions make it true.  It isn’t the terrorists, but the 
reaction that will alter the way of life in the US.  For the most part the government has 
dismissed the domestic terrorist threat and focused on foreign, Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, primarily Al-Qaeda.  These groups have extremely limited support within the US 
and almost no hope of toppling the American government let alone the system of 
government.  The terrorists can provoke an overreaction and it is this reaction that poses 
the greatest threat to our way of life. 
There is plenty of evidence of an early overreaction by the President and the 
Congress.  The President’s adopted the imagery of war and congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act without any significant debate and in an incredibly short amount of 
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time.98  The use of the rhetoric of war, while common in the US, has advantages for the 
President.  War carries connotations of national survival, sacrifice, and total commitment.  
The President has expanded this need for total commitment to the international 
community and declared that: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”99  
The early and almost fanatical rhetoric used by the President, (the use of crusade was 
politically incorrect but not inaccurate), followed up by the rhetoric of Rumsfeld and 
Wolfowitz has already had an impact on the United States’ relations with its friends and 
allies. 
US policies, rhetoric and actions during the war on terrorism will have significant 
implications for American society.  If the consequences of the US strategy and its 
implementation are too costly it may not matter whether the US defeats some or all 
terrorists.  If the US is not careful how it fights terrorism, whatever victory it achieves 
may be pyrrhic. 
        
B.  STRESSES AND RESPONSES 
Military involvement in the Global War on Terrorism officially began on October 
7, 2001 with the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom.  The operation started modestly 
with some aircraft and special operations forces (SOF) but has expanded at a frenetic 
pace since then.  Currently the US has about 160,000 troops directly involved in the war 
on terror and it is doubtful that these numbers will change significantly in the near-
term.100  Sustainment of this operations tempo is extremely taxing in the short-term and 
will be impossible to maintain in the long run with an all-volunteer force.  Whether the 
administration likes it or not, the expansion of the military role in the fight against 
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terrorism is about to undergo a strategic pause.  The overuse of the military in the name 
of the war on terrorism has significant implications for the military now and in the future 
as the current issues cascade forward. 
Operation Enduring Freedom has had a significant impact on all of the armed 
services but the strains have been greatest on the Army including its reserve components.   
In general the other services have had to support a relatively short surge in demand 
during major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  This surge was followed by a 
period of relative calm that allowed them to rest, refit and refurbish their forces.  This has 
not been as true for the Army, which has had to shoulder the bulk of the burden of 
occupation and reconstruction duties.  Although it represents the extreme case of the 
stresses induced by the fight against terrorism, the problems challenging the Army are 
generally representative of those faced by the other services.  For this reason, this section 
will focus on the magnitude of the problems affecting the Army and the actions the Army 
is taking to cope with them.   
Due to the constraints of information available and scope I will look at the 
operational stresses on the Army as a whole.  This approach ignores the heavier burden 
carried by SOF and some other high demand specialties such as military police and civil 
affairs, but gives an appreciation of the stresses on the military as a whole.  Of the 
370,000 military personnel deployed worldwide, roughly 9,000 soldiers are deployed in 
Afghanistan and 146,000 are deployed in Iraq.101  These 155,000 soldiers represent a 
number the Army cannot sustain.  When a commander in Afghanistan requested one 
more battalion there were none available.102  The US has been in Afghanistan for two 
years and is now working on a five to eight year community master plan for its bases at 
Bagram and Kandahar.103  In the cases of both Iraq and Afghanistan, the administration 
continues to state that troop levels will be determined by the security situations, not fixed 
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timetables or domestic political considerations.  If this is true and the attacks in those 
countries continue at or near the current level, significant forces will need to remain for 
some time to come.   
During July, 26 of the 33 combat brigades in the Army were engaged in 
missions.104  This OPTEMPO is unsustainable.  Army policy emphasizes 6-month 
deployments to balance training, operations, and personnel needs.  This means the Army 
needs three brigades for every brigade deployed: one deployed, one preparing for 
deployment, and one recovering from deployment.  Army strategies and force structure 
have been designed around this policy.105  In order to maintain this OPTEMPO and 6-
month rotations the Army would need 78 combat brigades.  These numbers are not 
available, even when reserve forces are included so the military has had to make drastic 
adjustments to its plans.106   
For the first time, Marines will be assigned occupation duties when troop 
rotations are conducted this winter.   In addition, the Army is taking drastic action.  The 
Army has announced that it is implementing 12-month rotations for deployments to 
Afghanistan and Iraq.107  It is also increasing its reliance on the reserve components for 
the occupation of Iraq.  This is contrary to past practices when the reserve contribution 
was high during major combat operations then tapered off.  While the occupation forces 
in Iraq are planned to shrink by 20% this winter, reserve numbers will increase.  By 
spring the guard and reserve will make up nearly 40% of the forces in Iraq.108  In 
conjunction with its increased use of the guard the Army has directed the National Guard 
to provide 15 provisional military police companies (MP) by temporarily converting 
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artillery units into military police.  At least 2000 soldiers will be involved in this 
conversion.109   
Change will not be limited to the National Guard.  The Chief of Staff of the Army 
has announced plans to reorganize the divisions returning from Iraq.  The first to be 
converted are the 101st Airborne and the 3rd Infantry Division.  The intent of this 
reorganization is to expand the Army from 33 brigades to 48 slightly smaller brigade size 
units of action.110  The change represents a radical acceleration of a reorganization that 
was an element of the Army’s transition to its Future Force.111  The units of action of the 
Future Force are expected to be smaller than today’s brigades but significantly more 
lethal due to technological advances.  The Army Chief expects the smaller brigades being 
organized this year to be 1.5 times more capable than the units they are replacing.  This is 
despite the fact that their reorganization will be completed within one year and they will 
be outfitted with existing equipment and technology.  It remains to be seen where the 
funding will come from for this reorganization.   
Finally, the Army has reinstituted Stop Loss for active units while retaining it for 
reserve units.  Soldiers in active units selected for overseas deployment are locked into 
their units 90 days prior to their scheduled deployment.  Reserve component soldiers are 
locked in once their units are alerted for mobilization.  In both cases soldiers are 
prevented from leaving the military or changing units.112  The overstretch of the Army 
and the actions taken to deal with this problem are not the only issues to come out of the 
war on terror.  Operations and new roles within the US have implications for the military 
and also for its relations with society. 
US military operations in support of the war on terror actually began on 
September 11, when combat air patrols were initiated to prevent further suicide attacks 
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with aircraft.  Operation Noble Eagle113 and the creation of U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) stressed the military and have implications for the future of the military 
and its relationship with society.  While Enduring Freedom has placed the most stress on 
the Army and its reserve components, Noble Eagle has weighed heaviest on the Air and 
Army National Guards.  The DOD deployed 358 aircraft within 24 hours of the attacks 
on September 11, 2001.  Air Force and Air National Guard fighter aircraft flew 
continuously through March 2002, and continue to do so intermittently.114  During this 
same period over 16,000 Army National Guard soldiers were mobilized to defend the 
nation’s borders and protect critical infrastructure.  An additional 8,100 guardsmen were 
deployed to protect Air Force bases within the United States and others have been 
mobilized to protect domestic Army installations.115   The impact of Noble Eagle has 
been minor compared to Enduring Freedom. However, the effects of the two operations 
are cumulative.  The military has not taken any specific actions to cope with the relatively 
low stresses imposed by Operation Noble Eagle.  All major actions taken to date have 
been in reaction to the bigger problems associated with Enduring Freedom.     
While the deployments in support of Noble Eagle mainly impact readiness, the 
creation of NORTHCOM, and the concurrent emphasis on the military role in homeland 
defense, has serious implications for the military and society.  NORTHCOM is 
responsible for the land, sea, and air defense of the continental United States.  Its creation 
means there is one military command responsible for all support of civil authorities 
during natural and manmade disasters.  It also provides a planning staff to prepare for 
contingencies involving attacks on US soil. To date the creation of NORTHCOM has had 
minimal impact.  It is staffed with about 750 people and like other combatant commands; 
it does not have any combat units permanently assigned to it.  The importance of 
NORTHCOM lies in the potential implications of an increased military role in domestic 
affairs. 
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C.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACTIVE ARMY 
While the stresses on the entire military are similar, the implications of the 
immediate actions taken in response vary somewhat from service to service and between 
the active and reserve components.  The Army is playing the largest role by far in the war 
on terror therefore the implications of the stresses and corresponding actions taken are 
greater for the Army than for the other services.  It is safe to say that any implications 
confronting the Army impact the other services but to a lesser degree.  For these reasons, 
along with brevity, this section will focus on the implications for the Army.   
As discussed earlier, the OPTEMPO of the war on terror in general, and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom specifically, is imposing severe stresses on the Army.  In 
response the Army has taken or proposed several major actions to mitigate these stresses.  
These actions include: the institution of 12-month rotations, the reorganization of combat 
divisions recovering from deployment to Iraq, reinstitution of Stop Loss, accepting a 
greater reliance on reserve forces, and ordering a temporary reorganization of some 
reserve units.  The last two actions concern the reserves and will be dealt with in the next 
section.  All of the other actions planned have significant implications for the Army 
however, the lag before they are felt and the potential duration of the consequences vary. 
All of the consequences of actions taken by the Army today affect readiness in 
some way.  Readiness can be broken down into two broad categories; personnel and 
material.  Personnel readiness includes training and education, and unit manning levels or 
strength.  Material readiness includes the operational readiness rate (OR) of major 
equipment, percentage of required equipment on hand, and adequate inventories of spare 
parts.  Stop Loss and 12-month rotations have significant implications for personnel 
readiness while 12-month rotations and the division reorganization plans will have major 
impacts on material readiness.  First I will deal with implications for personnel readiness 
followed by material readiness issues. 
The first significant action taken by the Army in reaction to over-use was the 
institution of 12-month rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan.  The decision to implement 12 
month tours was a drastic one and carries serious consequences for the combat readiness 
of units.  Extended tours will disrupt training cycles and hurt morale and retention rates. 
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Iraq is still a combat zone but battles there involve small units and the brigades 
and battalions rarely conduct integrated operations.  Also for much of the time deployed 
units perform missions that are not directly related to their normal combat missions such 
as manning checkpoints and searching cars.  Performing non-standard missions without 
proper training can have a negative impact on morale.  Furthermore, while deployed 
these units cannot conduct large-scale training exercises and soldiers cannot attend 
professional education courses required for promotion.  The current OPTEMPO also 
degrades the training level of non-deploying units.  Deploying units get priority of 
training areas, resources and ammunition.  Non-deploying units are often required to 
support the training of deploying units.  Operations induced shortages of ammunition 
mean many non-deploying units do not receive required allocations of ammunition for 
training.  Extended tours also have a significant impact on morale that will manifest itself 
in retention rates.   
While important, the impact of scheduled 12-month tours will not be as 
destructive as the surprise extension of tours was for soldiers involved in the initial 
combat operations.  The impact was greatest for soldiers in the 3rd Infantry Division. (3rd 
ID)  These soldiers had gotten used to 6-month rotations and expected to be redeployed 
as soon as major combat operations ended.  When this didn’t happen morale crashed.  In 
a convenience survey conducted by Stars and Stripes, 49% of soldiers rated morale as 
low or very low and were unlikely to reenlist.116  These survey results are most important 
for soldiers due for reenlistment shortly after completion of their deployment.  The Army 
depends on a certain percentage of soldiers to reenlist.  If these numbers drop 
significantly they will have a negative impact on unit manning and readiness.  Retention 
is critical because it involves experienced soldiers that cannot be replaced qualitatively 
with new recruits. 
The reinstitution of Stop Loss is another short-term fix with serious implications.  
Where retention and future readiness is concerned the stop loss part of the program is not 
as important as the stop movement portion.  Stop loss prevents soldiers from leaving the 
Army if their unit will deploy within 90 days.  Although these soldiers will be unhappy, 
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they were already scheduled to leave the Army.  Their displeasure will not affect Army 
retention numbers.  This is not true for soldiers who suffer under the stop movement 
portion of the program.  The stop movement portion prohibits soldiers from transferring 
out of a unit within 90 days of a pending deployment.  This prevents soldiers from 
attending schools and changing units.117  The Stop movement disrupts careers and lives 
and may increase the number of soldiers choosing not to reenlist.  Stop Loss / Stop 
Movement is a short-term fix that will hurt readiness in the future if it leads to an exodus 
of disgruntled soldiers.  It also has near-term implications which are magnified the longer 
the program is in effect.  Instead of having a small number of soldiers leave the Army on 
a weekly or monthly basis, all of these soldiers are held until Stop Loss is terminated.  
When this happens they all leave the military more or less at once, creating a bigger 
impact on manning. 
Short-term measures taken by the Army in response to current operational stresses 
also have implications for material and equipment readiness in the near and long-term.  
The institution of 12-month rotations has serious implications for material readiness.  The 
long deployments will disrupt normal maintenance schedules and lead to much higher 
equipment usage rates.  Heavy use depletes spare parts inventories and wears out 
equipment.  There is also the loss of equipment destroyed through enemy action and 
accidents.  These immediate consequences have a cascade effect on long-term readiness.  
The 2004 Defense Budget does not address reconstitute costs.  More importantly, it fails 
to fully fund operations and maintenance accounts at peacetime levels.  The Army alone 
faces a $148 million shortfall in spare parts and flying hours funding.  This shortage 
could have an immediate impact on readiness but normally these effects are delayed.  
Defense officials usually transfer funds from new weapons development to fix more 
immediate problems.  This in turn delays the fielding of new equipment and leads to 
increased maintenance costs as older equipment is used longer than planned. 118  The 
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administration has requested supplemental funds for the war on terror.119  This request 
includes funds that are supposed to be used for repair and replacement of equipment.  
However if operational costs exceed forecasts, this funding could be reallocated.  
The reorganization of brigades returning from Iraq can also be expected to have 
an impact on the future readiness of the Army.  The Army leadership denies the 
possibility but a potential consequence of the conversion plan could be a delay in the 
Fielding of the Future Combat System (FCS) and the Future Force.120  The biggest issue 
in the current reorganization is the lack of funding.  This plan has come out of the blue 
and there is no money in the FY04budget to implement it.  Any funding required will 
have to be shifted from other programs.  The current OPTEMPO rules out the transfer 
from current operating budgets.  The only choice left is to steal from projects that are 
under development and risk delaying the fielding of new systems and the Future Force. 
 
D.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY 
RESERVE 
As a whole the active Army is suffering more than the reserve components in the 
war on terror.  Nevertheless, the Guard and Reserve are carrying a significant burden and 
some specialties have been affected excessively.  Some MP units have spent 600 days out 
of the last two years on active duty.121  While the active Army and Army Reserve were 
spared mobilization or deployment for Operation Noble Eagle, the National Guard was 
not.  Guardsmen deployed to active military bases at home and abroad, the nation’s 
borders and airports, and critical infrastructure sites.  These initial deployments were 
followed by others in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  In 
many cases units faced nearly back-to-back mobilizations.   The implications of the fight 
against terrorism for the reserve components generally mirror those for the active forces 
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with some minor differences.  Despite these differences the consequences fall into the 
same broad categories of personnel and material readiness. 
Consequences of the war for personnel readiness are actually more acute in the 
reserves.  Many reservists believe they will never be mobilized.  Others expect to be 
mobilized for state or federal duty on rare occasions.  Many of these soldiers are happy to 
serve on active duty from time to time but for most there are reasons they are not 
members of the active military.  They resent being called to deploy on a regular basis for 
missions that don’t appear to be critical to national security.  This is especially true when 
they deploy while active forces remain at home.  While an exodus of active soldiers is 
possible, its rate is controlled by a soldier’s expiration of term of service (ETS) date.  
This is not as true in the guard and reserves.  In many states there are few or no 
consequences for a soldier that fails to complete his term of service.  If a soldier stops 
attending training he is discharged upon reaching a set number of absences.  This makes 
it much easier for dissatisfied reservists to vote with their feet.  In addition to the 
potential impact of deployments on unit manning there is a continued and significant 
impact on training levels in the reserves.  There are several issues degrading training for 
Reserve forces.   
The first major issue is homeland security mobilizations.  Reserve units have been 
mobilized under Noble Eagle to provide security for military installations at home and 
abroad.  In most cases these units are performing duties completely unrelated to their 
war-time missions.  Although they are on active duty, their duties prevent them from 
conducting most training related to their normal missions.  Many soldiers resent being 
mobilized to perform jobs that have nothing to do with the role they joined the military to 
do.  These feelings become stronger as the trauma of 9-11 recedes into the past.  
Mobilizations also hurt readiness in units that are not being deployed. 
Training in non-deployed units suffers due to several factors.  First, there is an 
Army-wide shortage of ammunition available for training.  This shortage has led to 
rationing and reserve units are the first units to feel the effects of cuts because they have 
the lowest priority.  These units can also have trouble obtaining other resources and 
training areas although this is not always true.  During the traditional summer annual 
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training (AT) window, reserve units have priority over all other units for training areas.  
The exception to this prioritization is deploying units.  Deploying units take precedence 
over all other units.  Many bases used by reserve units are also mobilization sites for 
deploying units.  In these cases it can be very difficult for non-deploying units to obtain 
training areas.  At the same time if the tenant units and other units that train at a given 
location have already deployed a unit may have access to more areas than normal.  
Finally training readiness can suffer due to transfers to deploying units. 
In the reserve components soldiers can volunteer to join deploying units, or to  
place themselves in a pool of replacements available to fill shortages in deployed or 
deploying units.   This creates holes vacancies in non-deploying units.  It is difficult to 
“train as you fight” when part of your team is absent.  The impact is even greater when 
the volunteers are experienced soldiers and leaders because it is the leaders in the unit 
that conduct most training.  In the case of large-scale extended mobilizations like Iraqi 
Freedom these problems cascade as more units are mobilized.  Personnel may transfer 
from a unit not expected to mobilize only for it to deploy at a later date with more 
vacancies that now need to be filled.  This same issue occurs with material readiness.   
Most reserve units do not have all the equipment they are authorized.  When a 
unit is mobilized, cross-leveling is conducted to bring its equipment on-hand as close to 
100% as possible.  This system works fine for small or limited duration conflicts.  In 
larger conflicts, such as the current war in Iraq, the system breaks down.  The problems 
get worse as you look at units later in the deployment cycle.  A unit that was never 
resourced at 100% may have several deploying units “borrow” equipment, and then be 
deployed itself.  The system is supposed to be designed so that no unit will fall below a 
certain readiness level but this is small consolation for a unit deployed after it has given 
up critical items.  Furthermore, many items are never returned or may come back 
damaged or worn out.  Again the system is supposed to prevent this but a unit usually has 
the choice of accepting worn and broken equipment or getting nothing at all.   For units 
that are deployed, battle losses may never be replaced.  The same shortfall in 
maintenance funding for the active component also applies to the reserve component 
except it is worse.  The reserves are funded at a lower rate to start with.  When they 
74 
deplete inventories and wear out vehicles during a deployment, they have fewer funds to 
refurbish and restock.  These equipment issues also apply to morale and training 
readiness problems.  Soldiers get frustrated when they don’t have equipment required for 
training or if it is broken and they lack the parts to fix it.  This frustration lowers morale 
and can cause retention problems. 
 
E.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The current state of civil-military relations in the US is difficult to judge.  
Available information doesn’t point to a single conclusion.  There have been numerous 
reports of friction but the conflict is not always between the civilian leadership and the 
uniformed military leadership.  In many cases it is between the civilian military 
leadership and other departments or the civilian leadership within the DOD.  The most 
visible issue in civil-military relations is the relationship between Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and almost everyone else.  While it is hard to make an accurate 
assessment of where civil-military relations stand, it appears that success in the fight 
against terror has had a positive effect.  This may change if the conflict and daily losses 
in Iraq continue.  
When Donald Rumsfeld took charge of the DOD in 2001 he was determined to 
transform the department and appeared to have particular problems with the Department 
of the Army. (DA)  He was not satisfied with the pace or vision for Army transformation.  
In addition there were reports of personality conflicts with General Shinseki, the Chief of 
Staff.  Surprisingly, all friction was not between civilian and military leaders.  Secretary 
of the Army White sided with the Army when Rumsfeld decided to cancel the Crusader 
artillery system in 2002.  When the program was cancelled Army leaders, with the 
knowledge of White, went to congress for support.  This was considered a major factor in 
the 2003 resignation of White.122  In June 2003, Shinseki retired and Rumsfeld chose 
retired General Peter Schoomaker as his replacement. 
The selection of Schoomaker stirred up much debate in Washington.  Schoomaker 
was selected when the top active candidates for the job turned it down.  Their refusal of 
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the top job in the Army was read as an indictment of Rumsfeld and his leadership style.  
The speculation surrounding Rumsfeld’s relationship with the Army was further fueled 
when he chose a retired general as chief.  When the top candidates in the Army turned 
him down, Rumsfeld went outside the Army, bypassing the next level of candidates.  
This was taken by many as a slap in the face of the military leadership.  At this point 
Rumsfeld appears to enjoy a good relationship with the new Chief of Staff.   
There were also reports of significant friction between Rumsfeld and the military 
during the planning of Iraqi Freedom.  There were no public displays of conflict but it 
was widely known that General Franks, the officer in charge of the planning, was 
directed to make a series of downward revisions of the number of forces involved.  
General Franks never complained in public before or after his retirement.  However, a 
number of retired generals traveled the talk-show circuit complaining about the plan and 
Rumsfeld’s heavy-handed involvement.  The chorus became especially loud when the 
forces in Iraq bogged down temporarily.  It was widely believed at the time that the 
retired officers were voicing the concerns of senior active Army leaders.  Army generals 
have publicly supported Rumsfeld during the war and occupation of Iraq.  This is not true 
of civilians in other departments and the legislature. 
Rumsfeld has been a constant target of criticism since the war in Iraq began.  He 
was criticized for deploying an insufficient force when the offensive bogged down.  He 
was criticized again when the military failed to prevent massive looting following the 
collapse of the Iraqi government and the criticism has continued as US forces have 
struggled to control guerrilla attacks.  The constant focus of the complaints has been the 
inadequacy of the force deployed for the tasks it has been assigned.  Additional criticism 
was also directed at the defense department’s failure to plan and coordinate for the post-
conflict phase.  During this period the Army has publicly backed the secretary but the 
focus of public criticism on Rumsfeld may be masking continued friction between the 
secretary and the military. 
Despite reports of friction between the military and Secretary Rumsfeld, there do 
not appear to be any major problems between the military and civilian leadership.  Any 
problems appear to be the result of institutional inertia and the personality of the 
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secretary.  Following the open conflict of the Clinton administration, the military appears 
to have relearned or grown to accept the concept of civilian primacy.  This quiet 
acceptance may stem from the military’s relationship with President Bush and the 
solidarity of a nation at war.  It is also a result of the strength of American institutions 
and the professionalism of the military.  Despite the apparent lack of real civil-military 
friction, the situation could quickly change if conditions in Iraq deteriorate further.  The 
wider war on terrorism may stress the military but the bulk of the Army is in Iraq.  This 
critical mass of military power and public attention means that events in Iraq will remain 
the key to relations between both the government and the military and the government 
and the nation.  While Iraq is the current key, the area of homeland security has the 
potential to become the central issue in civil-military relations. 
Concerns about the threat posed by WMD and the traumatic attacks of 9-11 have 
spurred a push toward a broader military role in homeland security.  Instead of the 
military seeking more power, influence and resources associated with this role they 
continue to resist.  The military continues to focus on homeland defense, a mission in 
which it plays the lead agency role.123  Even at NORTHCOM, the headquarters 
responsible for defense of the nation’s borders and response to internal emergencies, the 
leadership plays down its security role.  This may be out of a sense of political 
correctness or it may be because the Army is assigned a supporting role in homeland 
security.  It makes sense that an overstretched military would be wary of shifting limited 
resources from its primary role of war fighting to a secondary mission.  A recent GAO 
reported criticized the military for failing to evaluate its force structure for domestic 
operations.  It notes that forces remain trained, organized and equipped for overseas 
combat missions.124  While the criticism is unwarranted, especially in light of current 
deployments, it does highlight a reluctance on the military’s part to engage in domestic 
missions.  While it must remain subservient to the civilian leadership, the military still 
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has a duty to inform civilian leaders of its capabilities and the best ways to employ them.  
There is strong evidence supporting the military’s position that it should play a minimal 
role within the nation’s borders.  In many cases where the military has been deployed to 
support civilian authorities it has ended up working independent of civilian authority or 
exercising authority over civilian agencies.  This was the case respectively, in Los 
Angeles during the Rodney King riots, and in Northern Ireland during the “Troubles.”  In 
both cases the military performed traditional law enforcement missions that it was not 
properly trained or equipped for.125  In the case of consequence management for WMD 
attacks, despite their preparation for war under chemical conditions, most military units 
are not trained or equipped to assist in the decontamination and treatment of civilians 
exposed to WMD.  The National Guard Civil Support Teams that are trained in this area 
receive most of their training from non-military sources.  There is no real reason for 
keeping this capability in the military.  It could just as easily be funded federally and 
placed within state, county, or municipal government.  The use of the military to support 
civil authorities should be a measure of last resort but the creation of units dedicated to 
these roles means that they will be used and it is the nature of any government program to 
grow, not shrink.  The dedication of scarce military resources to a role that has no 
application to combat operations at a time of severe overstretch may contribute to the 
erosion of readiness.  In addition, the dedication of military assets has two potential and 
contradictory implications for civil-military relations. 
First, and of lower consequence, the forced diversion of resources will probably 
lead to increased friction between civilian and military leadership.  The US military has a 
tradition of resisting civilian input on roles and missions.  This outcome is likely if the 
issue is forced during a period of extensive mobilizations and deployments.  The military 
is often asked to do more with less, but to divert forces during an all but declared war 
would definitely inspire resistance. 
The opposite of this reluctance is also a potential outcome, albeit not in the short-
term.  While the military is currently trying to minimize its domestic role, this may not 
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remain the case.  If the external threat were to decline significantly and military resources 
and influence were to parallel this decline, the military might see the value of an 
expanded domestic role.  While highly unlikely, an expanded domestic mission list has 
the potential to become a slippery slope.126  Once involved in domestic affairs the 
military is reluctant to get out.  It also loses focus on external enemies and may start 
looking for new internal enemies.  The combination of declining external threats and 
increasing internal (terrorist) threats leads to tension between the military and civilians.  
A decrease in civilian control occurs at the same time military interest in internal affairs 
is growing.127  This behavior has been a constant in Latin American civil-military 
relations for nearly 50 years and is not unique to that continent.  While the first case is 
more likely and the implications of it are minor, the second case is still possible and the 
consequences would be catastrophic for American democracy. 
 
F.  CONCLUSIONS 
The US is just two years into its “war on terror” and any judgments of progress 
are premature. History has shown that terrorist groups are difficult to eliminate and the 
task is almost never accomplished quickly.  Furthermore, while the question of winning 
or losing is popular, it is also narrow and short-sighted.  The broader and more important 
issue is the implications of the conduct of the fight for the US and its position in the 
world.  The President labeled the fight against terrorism as a war and which invokes 
imagery of a decisive victory signaling the defeat of terrorism.  Although he admitted that 
victory would not come quickly or easily, he never admitted that failure was a possibility.  
In reality, the prospect of victory under the broad terms defined by the President is 
unlikely.  Victory would be more likely but still difficult if the President had declared war 
on a single organization such as Al-Qaeda.  Instead, President Bush has declared that all 
terrorists represent a threat to our way of life.  This is only true if US policies and actions 
make it true.  The terrorists can provoke an overreaction and it is this reaction that poses 
the greatest threat to our way of life.  There is plenty of evidence of an early overreaction 
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by the President and the Congress.  The President did not just adopt the imagery of war, 
he chose to lead the country into war in the name of fighting terrorism.  
The US currently has about 160,000 troops directly involved in the war on terror.  
Sustainment of this pace of operations strains the economy and the military.  It will be 
impossible to maintain in the long run with an all-volunteer force.  The overuse of the 
military in the war on terrorism has significant current and future implications for the 
military.  Operation Enduring Freedom has had a significant impact on all of the armed 
services but the strains have been greatest on the Army including its reserve components. 
Roughly 9,000 soldiers are deployed in Afghanistan and 146,000 are deployed in 
Iraq.  The US has been in Afghanistan for two years and there is little evidence of 
improving security.  The US is now working on a five to eight year plan for its bases in 
Afghanistan.  If the situation there is an indicator of what can be expected in Iraq then the 
US can expect to have nearly half of its combat forces tied up in the war on terrorism for 
years to come.  Army policy emphasizes 6-month deployments to balance training, 
operations, and personnel needs.  This means the Army needs three brigades for every 
brigade deployed: one deployed, one preparing for deployment, and one recovering from 
deployment.  This system does not work when large forces are deployed continuously.  
The military has had to make a number of adjustments to maintain the pace of operations. 
As a result Marines will be assigned occupation duties for the first time when 
troop rotations are conducted this winter.  In addition, the Army is taking drastic action.  
It has announced that it is implementing 12-month rotations for deployments to 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  It is also increasing its use of the reserve components.  By spring 
the guard and reserve will make up nearly 40% of the forces in Iraq.  In conjunction with 
its increased use of the guard the Army has directed the National Guard to provide 15 
provisional military police companies (MP) by temporarily converting artillery units into 
military police.  Change will not be limited to the National Guard.  The Chief of Staff of 
the Army has announced plans to reorganize the divisions returning from Iraq.  The intent 
of this reorganization is to expand the Army from 33 brigades to 48 slightly smaller 
brigade sized units of action.  Finally, the Army has reinstituted Stop Loss for active units 
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and retained it for reserve units.  In both cases soldiers are prevented from leaving the 
military or changing units.  All of these short-term solutions will have consequences.   
All of the actions taken by the Army today affect readiness in some way.  
Readiness can be broken down into two categories; personnel and material.  Stop Loss 
and 12-month rotations have significant implications for personnel readiness while 12-
month rotations and the division reorganization plans will have major impacts on material 
readiness.   The decision to implement 12 month tours was a drastic one and carries 
consequences for the combat readiness of units.  Extended tours will disrupt training 
cycles and hurt morale and retention rates.  The reinstitution of Stop Loss is another 
short-term fix with serious implications.  The stop movement portion of the program will 
disrupt soldiers’ lives and their professional education opportunities.   
The increased reliance on the guard and reserve also has serious implications for 
morale and personnel readiness.  They are already carrying a significant burden and some 
specialties have been affected excessively.  Some MP units have spent 600 days out of 
the last two years on active duty.  Reserve forces were originally organized to augment 
the active forces in a major war.  However, Iraq is seen as an occupation not a war.  The 
heavy use of reserves for missions that are not universally seen as essential to the nation 
breeds resentment and lowers retention rates in affected units.   
The reliance on reserves for homeland security missions also impacts training 
readiness.  Reserve units have been mobilized under Noble Eagle to provide security for 
military installations at home and abroad.  In most cases these units are performing duties 
completely unrelated to their war-time missions.  Their duties prevent them from 
conducting most training related to their normal missions so they are not ready for 
missions like Iraqi Freedom.  Training in non-deployed units also suffers.  The Army-
wide training ammunition shortage hurts non-deploying reserve units the most.  It can 
also be difficult for non-deploying units to secure training areas as deploying units have 
priority on all resources.   
The large scale of mobilizations also exacerbates equipment shortages.  Most 
reserve units are not equipped with 100% of the equipment they are authorized.  When a 
unit is mobilized, equipment is drawn from other units to bring its equipment on-hand as 
close to 100% as possible.  This system works fine for small or limited duration conflicts.  
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In larger conflicts, such as the current war in Iraq, the system breaks down.  The 
problems get worse as you look at units later in the deployment cycle.  A unit that was 
never equipped at 100% may have several deploying units “borrow” equipment, and then 
be deployed itself.  These equipment issues also apply to morale and training readiness 
problems.   
The most visible issue in civil-military relations is Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld.  He has clashed with the senior military leadership over transformation and 
war planning.  When he had to select a new Army Chief of Staff, the top candidates 
turned him down.  Their refusal of the top job in the Army was read as an indictment of 
Rumsfeld and his leadership style.  His relationship with the military leadership should 
not be over-stressed in evaluating civil-military relations.  In addition to his problems 
with the military leadership, he has clashed with civilian leaders within and outside of the 
defense department repeatedly.  In spite of reports of friction between the military and 
Secretary Rumsfeld, there do not appear to be any major problems between the military 
and civilian leadership.   
Despite the apparent lack of real civil-military relations issues, the situation could 
quickly change if the situation in Iraq deteriorates further.  The wider war on terrorism 
may contribute to the stress on the military but the bulk of the Army is in Iraq.  This 
critical mass of military power and public attention means that events in Iraq will remain 
the key to relations between the both the government and the military and the government 
and the nation.  While Iraq is the current key, the area of homeland security has the 
potential to become the central issue in civil-military relations.  Concerns about the threat 
posed by WMD have spurred calls for a broader military role in homeland security.   
The military is currently trying to minimize its domestic role but this may not 
remain the case.  If the external threat were to decline significantly and military resources 
and influence were to parallel this decline, the military might see the value of an 
expanded domestic role.  An increased interest in internal missions on the part of the 
military would not bode well for continued civilian control f the military. 
The expansion of the war on terror from a fight against terrorists to a fight against 
everybody associated with terrorists has put significant strains on the military.  These 
stresses and the military’s attempts to cope in the short-term will have future 
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consequences.  The military will suffer problems of material and personnel readiness.  
The only question is what the extent of these problems will be.  The heavy use of the 
military and calls for an expanded internal role may also negatively impact both civil-
military relations, and civilian control of the military.  Given the limited prospects for 
success in the war on terror through large-scale military operations the administration 
needs to carefully consider its current course of action.  The costs may drastically 
outweigh the gains. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
A.  COUNTERTERRORISM PRIOR TO 9-11 
The US did not have a comprehensive national counterterrorism strategy prior to 
the attacks of 9-11.  Terrorism was seen as one of many threats that could be addressed 
through policy directives and law enforcement.  President Clinton issued Presidential 
Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39) shortly after the bombing of a federal building in 
Oklahoma City in 1995.  PDD 39 outlined the new US policy on counterterrorism.  US 
counterterrorism policy was to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against 
US citizens, territory, or facilities.  Terrorism was considered a criminal act and a 
potential threat to national security.   
The policy described four steps to be taken to ensure the US was prepared to 
combat terrorism at home and abroad.  These steps consisted of: reducing vulnerability, 
deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and developing the capability to detect, 
prevent, and manage the consequences of attacks employing WMD.  The policy placed 
top priority on preventing terrorists from obtaining WMD capabilities. 
PDD 62 and 63, both issued in 1998 were intended to expand on PDD 39 and 
clarify government policy on fighting terrorism.  PDD 62 established the National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.  PDD 63 
called for an integrated national effort to protect the nation’s infrastructure.  Before 9-11, 
the focus was on defense and reducing vulnerability.  This focus, which began with PDD-
39, ignored the difference between probable threats and potential but highly unlikely 
threats.  Instead of considering risk, it emphasized vulnerability.  PDDs-39, 62, and 63 
represent the foundation of a national counterterrorism strategy but they were policy 
documents, not a strategy.   
The military role in combating terrorism can be divided into two arenas; domestic 
and international.  There were two areas in the international sphere where the military 
was expected to play a role.  These roles were deterrence and response.  The military 
always plays a supporting role during domestic operations but sometimes plays the lead 
role in international incidents. The military uses two separate definitions to describe its 
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roles in combating terrorism.  It defines counterterrorism as offensive actions taken 
against terrorists, and it defines antiterrorism as defensive measures taken to protect US 
personnel and facilities. Prior to 9-11 the public role of the military was limited to 
antiterrorism. 
During the 1990s the military was directed to plan and organize for new domestic 
missions in support of the fight against terrorism.  The DOD developed the Domestic 
Preparedness Program to enhance the readiness of state and local first responders.  It also 
created the National Guard WMD civil support teams (WMD-CST) and the Marine 
Corps Chemical and Biological Incident Response Force, (CBIRF).  These units 
enhanced the military’s ability to respond to a terrorist attack involving CBRN weapons. 
Clinton era counterterrorism policies were based on the criminality of terrorism 
and the primacy of law enforcement.  PDD-39 described the aims of combating terrorism 
as deter, defeat, and respond.  While PDDs 39, 62, and 63 formed the foundation for a 
counterterrorism strategy, no integrated and resourced strategy was developed prior to 9-
11.  Although these policies allowed for the use of military force in practice it played a 
limited role. 
 
B.  COUNTERTERRORISM AFTER 9-11  
The current National Security Strategy makes it clear that the administration 
considers terrorism the primary threat to US national security.  It provides a framework 
for the subordinate strategies that relate to the struggle against terrorism.  Of these 
strategies, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on finding and 
defeating terrorists abroad.   
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is goal oriented and aims for an 
end state where the world is free of the threat of terrorist attacks.  The four tenets of the 
strategy are defeat, deny, diminish, and defend.  The US plans to defeat terrorists by 
attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, support, and finances.  It will deny sponsorship 
and support to terrorist organizations through pressure on nations that provide 
sponsorship or sanctuary for terrorists.  It also seeks to diminish the conditions that create 
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fertile recruiting grounds for terrorists.  Finally the strategy plans to defend against 
attacks through preemption. 
The administration’s initial focus is on terrorist organizations with global reach 
and those pursuing weapons of mass destruction such as Al-Qaeda.  Through its actions 
in Afghanistan and Iraq it has sent a very clear message to remaining sponsors and hosts 
that the US is willing to take drastic measures to deny terrorists support and sanctuary.  
The US hopes to diminish the conditions that breed terrorist recruits by strengthening 
weak states and “winning the war of ideas.”   The final goal in the US strategy is to 
defend American citizens and interests at home and abroad.  This has meant an expanded 
role for the military at home and significant reorganization of government and military its 
command structures.   
This newly described strategy is accompanied by a new, aggressive attitude 
towards its implementation.  President Bush declared a global war on terrorism and in 
less than a month US forces were engaged in Afghanistan.  The most significant US 
attempt to defeat terrorists to date was the invasion of Afghanistan.  This operation 
eliminated a sponsor and sanctuary, and dispersed Al-Qaeda.  However, US operations in 
Afghanistan continue to tie down 9,000 American soldiers and the long-term contribution 
to success in the war on terror is debatable.   
The largest operation aimed specifically at eliminating a state sponsor of terrorism 
is Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Since the operation began, US officials have declared Iraq 
the central front in the war on terror.  The Iraqi regime was ousted but stability is still a 
dream and the bulk of army combat forces are bogged down trying to provide a 
semblance of security.  At this point the costs of the operation have been astronomical 
while the gains are still unknown.     
The military role in diminishing conditions conducive to terrorist recruitment is 
limited mainly to civic action programs conducted wherever US combat troops are 
deployed.  These efforts are concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan where the military is 
playing a major role in reconstruction efforts.  However in Afghanistan the US refuses to 
assist in providing security.  It is only interested in hunting terrorists.  The contributions 
these actions make toward the war on terror are highly debatable but reconstruction 
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without security will achieve nothing.  Instead of winning the war of ideas, the US is now 
seen by many as a threat to peace.   
The military role in homeland security changed significantly following the attacks 
of 9-11.  One problem discovered as security efforts expanded was the lack of an 
appropriate command structure.  Partly in response, the DOD made a major change to its 
Unified Command Plan.  It established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) which 
began operations on October 1, 2002.  NORTHCOM is now responsible for all military 
support to civil authorities and defense of the US. 
 
C.  CHANGES IN STRATEGY 
Many of the principles behind the current strategies are the same ones described 
under Clinton.  PDD 39 outlined the aims of US policy to deter, defeat, and respond to all 
terrorist attacks.  This policy was further divided into four steps.  These were: to reduce 
vulnerability, deter terrorism, respond to terrorism, and develop capabilities to detect, 
prevent and manage the consequences of CBRN attacks.  The Bush strategy sets four 
goals.  These are: defeat, deny, diminish, and defend.  Both presidents considered WMD 
a critical threat.  The biggest policy difference is the new emphasis on preemption and 
offensive action.  There have been three major changes following the attacks of 9-11.  
First, the Bush administration designated terrorism as the primary threat to the nation’s 
security.  Second, the administration tied all of the policies and strategies together in a 
relatively comprehensive strategy.  Finally, Bush has taken a much more aggressive 
approach to the threat in which military force has replaced the traditional primacy of law 
enforcement.  Except for the shift to preemption, these changes are more shifts in 
emphasis and execution.  It is notable that the Bush administration did not develop a 
comprehensive strategy before the attacks of 9-11.  It is very likely that without the shock 
of that event the administration would have carried on in the same manner as its 
predecessor.  A strong indicator of this is the campaign rhetoric used by Bush.  He was 
very critical of US engagement and the commitment of the military to situations that he 
did not consider to be critical to US vital interests. 
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D.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY 
Only two years into the conflict, it is too early to judge whether the US is winning 
or losing.  This may also be the wrong question.  The question of winning or losing is 
popular but narrow and shortsighted.  The broader and more important issue is the 
implications of the conduct of the fight for the US and its position in the world.  Critical 
to the US position is its wealth and military power.  Bush has declared that terrorists 
represent a threat to our way of life but this is only true if US policies and actions make it 
true.  The terrorists have provoked an overreaction and it is this reaction that poses the 
greater threat to our way of life.  The President chose to lead the country into war in the 
name of fighting terrorism.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has testified that 
terrorism is the primary focus of the military.128  The commitment of the entire US 
military machine against a relatively small number of terrorists has serious implications 
for the military, its ability to project US power, and our country.   
The US currently has about 160,000 troops directly involved in the war on terror.  
This number cannot be maintained in the long run with an all-volunteer force.  The 
overuse of the military in the war on terrorism has significant implications for the 
military’s readiness.  The US has been in Afghanistan for two years and there is little 
evidence of improving security.  If the situation there is an indicator of what can be 
expected in Iraq then the US can expect to have nearly half of its combat forces tied up 
performing occupation duties for years to come.  After less than a year fighting / 
occupying in Iraq the military has had to make a number of adjustments to maintain the 
pace of operations. 
The military has announced the implementation of 12-month rotations for 
deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.  It is also increasing its use of the reserve 
components.  The Army has directed the National Guard to provide 15 provisional 
military police companies by temporarily converting artillery units into military police.  It 
has also announced plans to reorganize the divisions returning from Iraq.  The Army has 
reinstituted Stop Loss for active units and retained it for reserve units.  All of these 
                                                 
128 Department of State, International Information Programs, “Myers Says Terrorism Remains 
Primary Focus of U.S. Military,” 13 February 2003, 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/03021306.htm> (11/9/2003). 
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actions are short-term solutions for what may be long-term problems and affect personnel 
and material readiness levels.  Stop Loss and 12-month rotations have significant 
implications for personnel readiness while 12-month rotations and the division 
reorganization plans will have major impacts on material readiness.   Extended tours will 
disrupt training cycles and hurt morale and retention rates.  The stop movement portion 
of the Stop Loss program will disrupt soldiers’ lives and their professional education 
opportunities.  The increased reliance on the guard and reserve also has serious 
implications for morale and personnel readiness of these forces.  Reserve forces were 
originally organized to augment the active forces in a major war.  However, Iraq is seen 
as an occupation not a war.  The dependence on reserve forces also means that erosion of 
their capabilities will impact the ability of the military to execute its missions.   
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s relations with DOD personnel and key 
leaders in other agencies are the most visible current issue in civil-military relations.  He 
has clashed with the senior military leadership over transformation and war planning.  In 
addition to his problems with the military leadership, he has clashed with civilian leaders 
within and outside of the defense department repeatedly.  Current civil-military relations 
problems appear to be the result of his personality and do not indicate significant 
institutional problems.  This could change if the operation of Iraq continues indefinitely 
and public support sours.  While Iraq is the biggest immediate threat to good civil-
military relations the area of homeland security has the potential to become the central 
issue in this arena.  Calls for a broader military role in homeland security appear harmless 
in an established nation with strong institutions.  However, the potential for decay is 
always there.  Several South American countries had enjoyed stable democracy for 
decades prior to military coups.  While the threat of a coup is extremely small even in the 
long-run, it does exist.  The military is currently trying to minimize its domestic role but 
this may not always be the case.  If the external threat were to decline significantly and 
military resources and influence were to parallel this decline, the military might see the 
value of an expanded domestic role.  An increased interest in internal missions on the part 




E.  PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS 
The Bush administration has developed an integrated strategy to combat terrorism 
and is executing it aggressively.  There will be no future accusations that Bush failed to 
address the terrorist threat.  What will remain open for debate is the effectiveness of the 
strategy and implementation.  There are many current articles debating the extent of US 
progress in the war on terror.  There are also numerous government press releases and 
reports explaining how well we are doing in the war.  For the most part these all focus on 
actions taken by the government: reorganizations completed, assets seized, alleged 
terrorists captured.129  However there is little discussion of the impact of these actions on 
the threat posed by terrorism.  There are three questions that need to be considered.  The 
first is, does US strategy agree with the literature on defeating terrorist organizations.  
Second, are there contradictions within the strategy itself?  Finally, do US actions agree 
with its strategy? 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is based on four goals.  These are 
to: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary; 
diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit; and to defend U.S. citizens and 
interests.130   The defeat, deny, and diminish goals target terrorists, their supporters, and 
their recruits.   
The only goal to focus on the terrorist organizations aims at their physical defeat 
but does not target leaders and membership for psychological attack.  Crenshaw argues 
there are three factors in the decline of a terrorist organization.  These are the physical 
defeat of the organization, organizational disintegration, and the group’s strategic 
decision to abandon terrorism.131  Physical defeat alone is not sufficient to eliminate a 
terrorist organization.  The US strategy assumes that if enough terrorists are killed the 
organization will disintegrate and the members will abandon terrorism.   
                                                 
129 The White House, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 
September 2003). 
130 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 11-12. 
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The goal to diminish underlying conditions may be beneficial to the target 
populations but there is no evidence it will reduce the level of terrorism.  Hewitt found 
that violence was actually higher during good economic periods.132  Political reform also 
offers no guarantee of reduced violence.  Hewitt found there was a complex and indirect 
relationship between reforms and violence.  In the cases of Northern Ireland and Spain, 
terrorism remained a problem after substantial reforms.133  One problem is reforms are 
never revolutionary but are compromises.  Terrorists are radicals by nature and are not 
prone to compromise.  In addition, effective economic and political reforms are difficult 
to implement in a single nation but the US wants to impose these changes in many 
countries.  Even if this goal was based on sound theory, it would be extremely difficult to 
implement effectively.  The US policy for combating terrorism appears to ignore research 
on the subject.  In its attempts to diminish conditions that terrorists exploit, it can expect 
to spend much for little gain.  In its attempts to defeat terrorist organizations it can expect 
to kill many terrorists and limit their capabilities but fail to eliminate the terrorist groups.  
While a sound strategy executed poorly may fail, a poor strategy executed vigorously is 
bound to fail.  The US strategy appears to have a weak foundation but its execution 
should still be reviewed. 
On paper the four goals of the US strategy are complimentary.  Defeat is aimed at 
the terrorists themselves.  Deny is aimed at those who support the terrorists.  Diminish is 
aimed at those who might become terrorist recruits, and defend is aimed at protecting the 
US from the terrorists yet to be defeated.  While the first three goals target different 
groups, the impact on the terrorists is cumulative.  As the  terrorists are attacked their 
numbers decline through attrition and those who remain find it harder to find sanctuary 
and support.  They also find it harder to attract new recruits. As this cycle is repeated the 
organization gradually withers away.  There are two problems with this.  The first is that 
the theory discussed above does not support the argument.  The second problem is the 
execution of the strategy.  On paper the goals are complimentary.  In practice some goals 
conflict.  In execution the defeat and deny goals are generally complimentary.  However, 
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there is a significant conflict between both the deny and defeat goals, and the diminish 
goal that does not exist on paper.   
Instead of precisely targeting terrorist groups the US has invaded two Muslim 
nations during its war on terror.  There is no doubt that these attacks have eliminated two 
state sponsors but the impact of these losses on Al-Qaeda cannot be determined.  Also in 
the absence of stability and government control of both Afghanistan and Iraq, these 
countries may still provide a certain level of sanctuary.  While the benefits of 
counterterrorism through invasion will not be evident for some time, the costs are 
becoming apparent and directly counter the diminish goal.  The costs were also obvious if 
the US had chosen to look at the Israeli experience in both Lebanon and the occupied 
territories of Palestine.  The precise targeting of a Muslim terrorist group may or may not 
inflame Muslim public opinion.  The invasion of two Muslim nations within one year is 
certain to stir resentment and assist terrorist recruiting.  While the US attempts to 
encourage democracy and economic development, its actions send the opposite message.  
The US champions the rule of law while it holds hundreds of detainees in Cuba without 
access to lawyers or the courts.  The US promotes international agreements but acts 
unilaterally.  The longer the US stays in Iraq and the more attacks the US mounts on 
Muslim countries, the more converts to terrorism.  US actions to defeat and deny are 
directly contributing to a crushing defeat in the war of ideas it is trying to win.  It is 
obvious that even if US strategy was based on sound theory, its execution is flawed and 
would lead to failure.  The combination of a poor foundation and flawed execution seals 
its doom.  If it follows its current path, the US is bound to fail in its mission to eliminate 
global terrorism, and will probably fail in the more limited mission of destroying Al-
Qaeda.  This leaves two questions for the future. 
First, how much damage will the US do to itself and its position in the world 
during its war?  It is still believed by some that it was the arms race of the Cold War that 
led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While it is doubtful the US will travel that far 
down the road of ruin it is possible.  It should be a laughable question however; the bulk 
of the US military is currently tied up in duties directly related to the fight against 
terrorism.   
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Second, is the US really following a strategy or is it simply reacting.  The US 
does have a written strategy but this was written after the US was attacked and also after 
it began its war on terror.  While statements by bin Laden indicate his goal is to drive the 
US from the Middle East, there is no evidence he is trying to provoke an overreaction.  
Despite the lack of intent, Al-Qaeda appears to have drawn the US into an action-
reaction-action spiral of global scale.   
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